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Introduction
A dramatic shift in the economic and power structure of the
securities industry is currently in progress. Although competition to
traditional markets from electronic trading markets may be the
precipitating cause of this upheaval, more than technology is driving
these changes. The worldwide rise in stock exchange trading volume,
global integration of the capital markets and competition for trading
profits have triggered a disintermediation comparable to the unfixing
of commission rates. Decimalization has cut the conventional trading
increment, formerly twelve and a half cents, to a penny or less.
Futures exchanges similarly have been buffeted by technological
change, global competition and resulting cost pressures.
One important response to these challenges is demutualization.
The Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) has completed its
demutualization. The National Association of Securities Dealers Inc.
(NASD) has demutualized the Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc. (Nasdaq)
and is registering it as an exchange. The New York Stock Exchange,
Inc. (NYSE) announced it would demutualize in 1999, although thus
far it has not taken steps to do so. The Chicago Board of Trade, Inc.
(CBOT) has been similarly stalled in its demutualization initiative,
but it is restructuring its membership and operations, and plans to go
forward with a demutualization.
Demutualization by some key foreign exchanges has proceeded
at a faster pace. This trend is recent. The first exchange to
demutualize was the Stockholm Stock Exchange in 1993, but by the
middle of the year 2001 numerous additional stock and futures
exchanges had demutualized, including the Amsterdam Stock
Exchange, the London Stock Exchange, the Paris Bourse, the CME
and the Deutsche B6rse. The Stockholm and Australian Stock
Exchanges immediately went public and listed on their own boards.
1. See Amir N. Licht, Stock Exchange Mobility, Unilateral Recognition, and the
Privatization of Securities Regulation, Draft #2 (Oct. 17, 2000), at
http://papers.ssrn.comlpaper.taf?abstractid=246789.
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The Deutsche B6rse went public in February 2001.2 Public offerings
and listings before the end of 2001 are planned by other demutualized
exchanges including the London Stock Exchange, Euronext (a fusion
of the Paris, Amsterdam and Brussels exchanges) and Nasdaq.
Traditionally, stock exchanges operated in the form of nonprofit
mutual or membership organizations. To the extent market power
was not curtailed by competition or regulation, mutual governance
gave specialist or market maker members of an exchange control of
the price, quality and range of services produced by the exchange.
Exchange profits were returned to broker and dealer members in the
form of lower access fees or trading profits. Further, exchanges have
long operated as self-regulatory organizations (SROs) with members
contributing their time to governance and self-regulation to make
exchanges more effective and more profitable. Self-regulation was
enshrined in the federal securities laws with oversight by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In addition, in 1975 the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) was amended to
impose certain corporate governance structures on exchanges. The
Commodities Exchange Act similarly embraced self-regulation by
futures exchanges but mandated certain corporate governance
formats.
The pressure to reduce trading execution costs, the demands for
technological innovation and demutualization are raising many
market structure issues. These include regulation of electronic
communication networks (ECNs), or alternative market systems
(ATSs); market fragmentation; market information fees and other
exchange revenues; the fair treatment of customer orders; and
perhaps most importantly, the future of self-regulation. New
competitive strategies by exchanges and their members, including
demutualization, are raising conflicts of interest questions about self-
regulation that the SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) have only begun to address.
This article will argue that the SEC is attempting to re-regulate
market structure under a command and control model pursuant to
the national market system (NMS) provisions injected into the
Exchange Act in 1975 at a time when the monopoly trading regime
which led to the national market system mandate is breaking down.
An interesting and relevant question is whether current trading
technologies and the competition these technologies have engendered
should lead to a reduction of SEC market regulation, rather than the
increase in regulation envisioned by current SEC concept and
2. See Deutsche Bdrse Shares Jump, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6,2001, at Wl.
3. See Alan Cowell, The London Stock Exchange Says It Will Go Public in July, N.Y.
TIMES, May 25,2001, at W1.
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rulemaking releases, so that competition rather than regulation can
determine outcomes. Further, once trading spreads have been
reduced, the pressures for market structure changes may abate,
rendering new SEC regulatory initiatives unnecessary. The CFTC
model of regulation of exchanges is in the process of changing to
permit exchanges to engage in a greater degree of self-regulation in
order to compete with foreign exchanges.
This Article will also inquire into the future of self-regulation
and stock exchange governance in a world where stock exchanges are
not mutual organizations. Some argue for SRO consolidation. It is
possible that demutualization may lead to a transfer of some
regulation from exchanges to government regulators. A
countervailing trend could be that national regulators will be unable
to engage in effective regulation of trading markets in a trading
environment that moves across boundaries with the click of a mouse.
Therefore, more self-regulation and less government regulation may
be required to assure that global markets are fair and honest. Self-
regulatory organizations may have to be restructured, however,
because of the conflicts of interest demutualization and changing
trading platforms entail.
Part I of this Article will discuss the impetuses for
demutualization, the trend toward replacing exchange floors with
electronic trading markets and the SEC's response in the form of
Regulation ATS. Part II of this Article will summarize the antitrust
problems inherent in exchange trading practices and then Part III will
describe the national market system (NMS) mandate given to the
SEC in 1975 and current issues the SEC is addressing pursuant to this
mandate relevant to the changing nature of stock exchange trading.
The future of self-regulation for both securities and commodities
exchanges after demutualization will be discussed in Parts IV and V.
I. The Development of ECNs, ATSs, and Their Regulation
A. Drivers for Electronic Exchanges and Demutualization
ATSs are proprietary trading systems, sometimes referred to as
the "fourth market." They are operated by NASD members or
NASD-member affiliates and are similar to exchanges because they
allow two participants to meet directly on the system and are
maintained by a third party who also serves a limited regulatory
function by imposing requirements on each subscriber. ECNs are a
4. Jeffrey W. Smith et al, The Nasdaq Stock Market Historical Background and
Current Operation, NASD WORKING PAPER 98-01, Aug. 24, 1998, at 36 , available at
http:llwww.academic.nasdaq.comldocslwp9_Ol.pdf.
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special class of ATSs used to disseminate firm commitments to trade
to participants, or subscribers. ECNs may be linked into the Nasdaq
marketplace! Many broker-dealers have internal systems to
automate the firm's execution of customer orders, particularly firms
that internalize or purchase order flow. These systems are not
generally considered ATSs because all trades effected on internal
systems involve only the operator of the system and no external
parties.6
Although some ATSs and ECNs have been in operation for
many years, technological advances, trading volume increases and
pressures on trading profits have enabled some ECNs to become
serious competitors to Nasdaq and exchanges. Similarly, in order to
compete with foreign derivatives exchanges ECNs have developed for
financial futures. ECNs also are being developed for the bond
markets, and the trading of bonds may therefore become more
efficient. Trading efficiency necessarily means a reduction in trading
spreads and is therefore inevitably resisted by traditional traders.
Whether government regulators have any public interest justification
for either impeding or mandating a reduction of trading spreads
pursuant to the statutes under which they operate is a good question.
They have been doing so indirectly through new regulations for ATSs
and other initiatives. The SEC is inclined to equate cheaper
executions with better executions, but if spreads were reduced to
zero, there would be no market makers and liquidity would
evaporate.
Despite the rhetoric about the superiority of one trading system
over another, including the debate about the advantages of floor
based over electronic systems that continues in the United States,
there are only two basic types of securities trading markets: quote
driven and order driven. In recent years most trading systems have
been moving toward order driven marketplaces. Many of the market
structure debates revolve around the extent to which orders must be
disclosed to the marketplace or the degree of dealer intervention
required for liquidity. Further, the move from floor trading and
screen based market maker systems to electronic trading has occurred
for reasons of capacity and efficiency. When floors and market
makers can no longer efficiently handle their trading volume, markets
have moved to a new technological model, just as the blackboard
daily call auction gave way to a continuous auction on many
exchanges, and the NYSE specialist developed an electronic book.
It can be argued that electronic trading networks are likely to
destroy an exchange's natural monopoly and, therefore, the benefits
5. Id-
6. Id.
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of mutual governance may no longer be as valuable as before. A
related argument is that electronic exchanges and their competitors
are compelled to become for-profit corporations in order to be
efficient and to compete effectively. Another important driver for
demutualization of some exchanges has been the perceived need to
shift power within exchanges from one group of members to another
and to afford institutional customers direct access to exchange
facilities. Separating exchange membership from ownership may be a
politically and economically feasible way to effect such a shift and
resolve conflicts of interest between exchange members as well as
between exchanges and their members.
In order for floor trading to operate efficiently and to provide
adequate liquidity, specialists, market makers or local traders, as well
as floor brokers, need to be physically present. Limited access in the
form of exchange memberships provides an economic incentive for
their presence. Further, mutual ownership gives those market makers
and brokers a return on their specialized skills in the form of lower
access fees or higher trading profits. The time they devote to
exchange governance and self regulation enhances these profits.
Electronic trading demands a different trading constituency in that it
links widely dispersed buyers and sellers. It is in the economic
interest of an electronic marketplace to have screens in as many
locations as possible in order to attract order flow. ATSs and some
non-U.S. exchanges have found it advantageous to permit remote
access and to place screens with institutional investors. Retail
investors have also demonstrated an interest in such direct access.
Under the federal securities laws as currently drafted and
interpreted by the SEC in Regulation ATS,7 no registered exchange
may have institutional or individual investor members, but may only
have broker-dealer members. However, institutions and retail
customers could become shareholders of a demutualized exchange.
A separation of membership from ownership could then realign the
interests of investors, who are providing trading interest and liquidity
to an exchange pricing mechanism, and exchange members. It should
be noted, however, that exchange demutualizations in countries
outside the United States have thus far not generated the institutional
investor shareholding interest that was hoped for by some exchange
officials. Rather, the primary shareowners are former members.
In the late 1970s some believed that the trading markets would
and should become an electronic "black box," but this did not
happen. Buyers and sellers of securities want efficiency and liquidity
7. Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, Exchange Act Release
No. 34-40,760, 63 Fed. Reg. 70,844, at 70,852 (Dec. 22, 1998) [hereinafter Adopting ATS
Release].
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and, if they are intermediaries, they need to obtain best execution.
They also are concerned about market impact so they want
anonymity. Further, they are concerned about the financial ability of
counterparties to settle trades. Exchanges have historically provided
these functions with the exception of anonymity. But the pressure on
intermediary profits is undermining the acquiescence of those who
provide liquidity to support a continuation of past practices.
Commodities exchanges have been experiencing similar pressures.
The CBOT is no longer the world's biggest futures exchange, but has
been eclipsed by an electronic derivatives marketplace in Europe.'
Further, the CBOT's largest customers are going into competition
with the exchange. Accordingly, the CBOT determined to split in
two, and offer its customers side by side electronic trading and open
outcry floor trading, and at the same time, demutualize.9 The CME
has become an entirely electronic, demutualized for-profit exchange.10
Whatever new governance structures or trading systems replace
the traditional trading systems, there is a danger that demutualization
of exchanges will cause order flow to move away from exchanges to
competitive ATSs. Exchanges can be expected to fight to retain
order flow as Nasdaq has done by developing the SuperMontage.1
But as ATSs proliferate, member firms will no longer have the same
stake in an exchange's viability and success, and there will be
competition between exchanges and their members. As for-profit
exchanges expand, they may also begin to compete with their listed
companies. These developments have significant implications for
exchange governance and exchange self-regulation.
B. Decimafization
Traditionally, there was a one-eighth increment in the trading of
stocks in the United States. Not only were both exchange and over-
the-counter trading conducted in eighths, but the transactions were
reported in eighths. This trading convention was destroyed by an
antitrust investigation of Nasdaq, which will be discussed below. The
8. See Peter A. McKay, CBOT, Eurex Want Asian Partner, Internet Link, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 5, 1999, at C17.
9. David Barboza, Chicago Faces the Future, Reluctantly, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1999,
at C1.
10. See Peter A. McKay, CME's New CEO Devises a Five-Year Strategy, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 24,2000, at C17.
11. See Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes by the NASD and Amendment
Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 thereto and Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated
Approval of Amendment No. 9 Relating to the Establishment of the Nasdaq Order
Display Facility and Order Collector Facility and Modifications of the Nasdaq Trading
Platform, Exchange Act Release No. 43,863, 66 Fed. Reg. 8020 (Jan. 26, 2001) [hereinafter
SuperMontage Adopting Release].
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destruction of the one-eighth trading convention was comparable to
the unfixing of stock exchange minimum commission rates in its effect
on the profitability of certain segments of the securities industry, as
well as in the market structure issues it triggered.
Nasdaq began trading in one-sixteenth-point increments on June
2, 1997.12 At the same time as trading spreads were being
compressed, there was a government prompted move to change
trading conventions to decimals. The Common Sense Pricing Act of
1997 would have required stocks to be traded in dollars and cents
within a year of its enactment." While Congressional pressures to
effect such a change were frequently justified as lowering trading
costs and modernizing trading, they were resisted by the securities
industry, and to some extent the SEC, for two reasons. First, it was
anticipated that the move to decimalization would be costly and
would greatly increase stock market volume. This was one effect of
the unfixing of commission rates, and it had disastrous results because
securities firms were unable to adjust their systems to deal with this
increased volume. Second, there was a threat that trading increments
could drop to a penny or less. As the unfixing of commission rates
also demonstrated, once charges for the trading of stocks are
deregulated it is difficult to predict how low such charges will descend
or what collateral consequences will ensue.
Accordingly, the move to decimalization was slow due to worries
about operational capabilities. Although the NYSE voted to trade
stocks in decimals in June 1997, such trading did not begin until
January 2001, and Nasdaq did not change over to decimals until April
2001.' Contrary to expectations, the change to decimal pricing
strengthened the position of the NYSE as a central marketplace but
had some adverse consequences with respect to liquidity. ECNs have
not reached the critical mass necessary to become a genuine source of
pricing discovery rather than a derivative pricing mechanism."
Institutional investors have complained, however, that the shift to
decimals has permitted specialists to step in front of large orders and
12. Deborah Lohse, Nasdaq to Start Trading All Stocks in Sixteenths, WALL ST. J.,
May 29, 1997, at C1.
13. Common Sense Pricing Act, H.R. 1053, 105th Cong. (1997). This bill never
became law.
14. See Kate Kelly & Jeff D. Opdyke, Nasdaq to Complete Its Shift to Decimals With
All Stocks Priced in Dollars, Cents, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 2001, at C9; Vanessa O'Connell,
Conversion to Decimal System in Stocks Could Prove a Boon to Small Investors, WALL ST.
J., June 6, 1997, at Cl; Jeff D. Opdyke, NYSE Adds Decimals, Subtracts Fractions, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 29, 2001, at C1.
15. See Greg Ip, If Big Board Specialists Are an Anachronism, They're a Profitable
One, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 2001, at Al (commenting concerning NYSE specialists,
"Dinosaurs should be so hardy.").
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therefore has reduced liquidity.16 Although government pressures
forced the U.S. exchanges to convert to decimal trading, it does not
appear that this change has enhanced competition between the
NYSE, Nasdaq and ATSs.
C. Regulation ATS
SEC concern about ATSs dates back to the 1960s when the
NASD-developed Nasdaq and Instinet Corp. (Instinet) developed a
computer-based facility for trading equities that allowed institutional
investors to trade directly with one another. In response, the SEC
proposed Rule 15c2-10 under the Exchange Act in order effectively
to create a new nonstatutory classification for the regulation of
automated trading systems. 7 However, this rule was subsequently
withdrawn, 8 and the SEC permitted Instinet and other ATSs to do
business as registered broker-dealers.' 9 As a result, the SEC defined
the term "exchange" very narrowly as a system that utilizes the
capital of specialists to buffer price swings and add liquidity to a
marketplace "generally understood" to be an exchange."
In its Market 2000 Study the SEC examined the development of
alternative markets and services for equity trading in the context of
market fragmentation and competition. The staff noted that
alternative markets had been developing for 20 years, that they
produced improved trading services and enhancements and had put
pressure on the primary markets to operate more efficiently. 1
However, the staff also recognized that markets can fragment to the
point where price discovery is impaired and maintenance of fair and
orderly markets is difficult.' The Report noted that almost all ATSs
were regulated as broker-dealers, but the proliferation of such
systems could have effects on the NMS that should be closely
16. Jeff D. Opdyke & Gregory Zuckerman, Decimal Move Brings Points Of
Contention From Traders, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 2001, at Cl; Unger, Exchange Officials
Testify Decimals Have Affected Depth, Liquidity of Trading, 33 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA), at 803 (May 28,2001).
17. Notice of Proposal to Adopt Rule 15c2-10 under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, Exchange Act Release No. 34-8661, 34 Fed. Reg. 12,952 (Aug. 4, 1969).
18. Notice of Adoption of Rule llAb2-1, Exchange Act Release No. 34-11,673, 40
Fed. Reg. 45,422 (Sept. 23,1975).
19. Instinet Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. CCH 78,997 (Sept. 8,
1986), 1986 WL 67657 (SEC).
20. Self-Regulatory Organizations; Delta Government Options Corp.; Order Granting
Temporary Registration as a Clearing Agency, Exchange Act Release No. 34-27,611, 55
Fed. Reg. 1890 (Jan. 12, 1990). This interpretation was upheld by the Seventh Circuit. Bd.
of Trade of the City of Chi. v. SEC, 923 F.2d 1270,1272 (7th Cir. 1991).
21. DIV. OF MKT. REGULATION, SEC, MARKET 2000, AN EXAMINATION OF




monitored to determine whether additional regulation was
warranted.' Therefore more enhanced recordkeeping and reporting
was required."
The rulemaking proceeding resulting in Regulation ATS began
with a Concept Release, in which the SEC defined the term ATS as
"automated systems that centralize, display, match, cross, or
otherwise execute trading interest, but that are not currently
registered with the Commission as national securities exchanges or
operated by a registered securities association. 'z  The Concept
Release proposed a new regulatory regime that would either require
ATSs to register with the SEC as exchanges or would impose new
obligations that would permit ATSs to continue to be regulated as
broker-dealers but would require them to comply with rules designed
to improve their transparency and surveillance, as well as their
systems capacity, integrity and security.26
The SEC asserted that ATSs were handling almost twenty
percent of orders in OTC stocks and four percent of orders in NYSE
listed securities and, therefore, they needed to be better integrated
into the national market system.27  The particular concerns
highlighted by the Concept Release as a justification for increased
regulation of ATSs were market access and fairness, market
transparency and coordination, market surveillance and market
stability and systemic risks.' In general, commenters opposed the
"exchange-lite" concept and suggested that ATSs be permitted to
remain registered as broker-dealers.
The SEC then proposed rules and requested comment on a
framework that would allow ATSs to choose whether to be a market
participant and register as a broker-dealer, or to be a separate market
and register as an exchange. The thrust of these proposals was to
integrate ATSs into the NMS.30 Although the proposals were
controversial and generated a fair amount of negative comment, the
23. Id. at III-11.
24. Id. at 111-13. The SEC then promulgated Rule 17a-23 under the Exchange Act.
Recordkeeping and Reporting Requirements for Trading Systems Operated by Brokers
and Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 34-35,124,59 Fed. Reg. 66,702 (Dec. 28, 1994). In
connection with adopting Regulation ATS, the SEC moved these requirements into rules
17a-23 and 17a-24, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-23 and 17a-24 (1999). Adopting ATS Release,
supra note 7, at 70,891.
25. Regulation of Exchanges, Exchange Act Release No. 34-38,672, 62 Fed. Reg.
30,485, at 30,486 n.1 (June 4, 1997).
26. Id. at 30,487.
27. Id. at 30,486.
28. Id.
29. Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, Exchange Act Release
No. 34-39,884,63 Fed. Reg. 23,504 (April 29, 1998) [hereinafter Proposing ATS Release].
30. Id. at 23,504.
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SEC adopted its proposed framework with only minor modifications
on December 2, 1998. The purpose of the new regulation was to level
the playing field for ATSs, Nasdaq, and the registered exchanges.3'
SEC Chairman Levitt commented that he was "committed to
promoting the competitiveness and viability of exchanges." Thus, the
rule was designed to create "flexibility" for existing exchanges.'
The SEC's objective of bringing ATSs into the NMS was
accomplished by a new and expanded definition of the term
"exchange" that captured most ATSs and by a rule exempting ATSs
from exchange registration if they chose to register pursuant to
Regulation ATS and undertake certain new obligations as to the
transparency of their quotes and trades, fair access and systems
capacity. Although the SEC extolled the benefits of exchange
registration for an ATS, it refused to adjust any obligations of an
exchange, and it therefore discouraged most ATSs from choosing
exchange registration. The impact of the regulation on smaller ATSs
was minimal. It merely required a filing with the SEC regarding the
ATS's operations methods, quarterly filings and maintenance of an
audit trail." It also mandated oversight by an SRO, presumably
NASD Regulation, Inc. (NASDR). 4 Larger ATSs became more
heavily regulated under the new regulation.3
Exchange Act Rule 3b-16 reinterpreted the term "exchange" to
include "any organization, association or group of persons that: (1)
Brings together the orders of multiple buyers and sellers; and (2) uses
established, nondiscretionary methods (whether by providing a
trading facility or by setting rules) under which such orders interact
with each other, and the buyers and sellers entering such orders agree
to the terms of a trade., 36 The SEC justified its revised interpretation
on various grounds, particularly the broad statutory grant of
exemptive authority the SEC obtained in 19967 permitting the SEC
to craft a flexible regulatory framework for markets.' More
fundamentally, the SEC asserted that although traditional exchanges
still provide liquidity through two-sided quotations and raise an
expectation of liquidity at the quoted price, this is no longer the
31. 1& See also, Adopting ATS Release, supra note 7.
32. Neil Hare, Levitt Reminds NYSE, NASDAQ of SRO Rule as Exchanges Consider
Demutualization Plans, 31 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), at 1002 (July 30, 1999).
33. See Alternate Trading Systems; SEC Will Allow ATSs to Choose Registration as
Brokerage or Exchange, 30 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), at 1686 (Dec. 4,1998).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Adopting ATS Release, supra note 7, at 70,847.
37. National Securities Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3424
(codified at Exchange Act § 36,15 U.S.C. § 78mm (1999)).
38. Adopting ATS Release, supra note 7, at 70,899.
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essential characteristic of a securities market. Today's technology
enables markets participants to tap simultaneous and multiple sources
of liquidity from remote locations. 9
Using its exemptive authority under Section 36 of the Exchange
Act, the SEC adopted Exchange Act Rule 3a1-1 exempting from the
definition of an "exchange" any ATS that registers as a broker-dealer
and complies with Regulation ATS.4 The term "alternative trading
system" was defined as any system that "constitutes, maintains, or
provides a marketplace or facilities for bringing together purchasers
and sellers of securities or for otherwise performing with respect to
securities the functions commonly performed by a stock exchange"
and that does not "set rules governing the conduct of subscribers
other than the conduct of such subscribers' trading" on such system
or "discipline subscribers other than by exclusion from trading."4
This definition was intended to preclude any SRO from opting to
register as a broker-dealer rather than an exchange or association
unless it decides to give up its self-regulatory functions and complies
with Regulation ATS.4 ' An ATS subject to Regulation ATS must be
a member of an SRO.43
Various requirements as to quote and trade transparency and
access are imposed upon any ATS that has five percent or more of
the trading volume of any exchange listed, Nasdaq NMS or Nasdaq
SmallCap Security.44 Any such ATS must publicly disseminate its
best priced orders in such securities for inclusion in the quotation
data made available to quotation vendors by exchanges and the
39. Id.
40. Id. at 70,859.
41. 17 C.F.R. § 242.300(a) (1999). Although European exchanges have not yet faced
serious competition from ATSs, the Forum of European Securities Commissions
(FESCO) has noted that in the debt and standardized OTC derivative markets electronic
trading systems are replacing bilateral telephone trading and in equity markets ATSs have
signaled additional competition for exchanges with near monopolies. FESCO therefore
has outlined potential risks posed by ATSs and formulated standards for their regulation.
See Proposed Standards for Alternative Trading Systems, Consultative Paper, at
http://www.europefesco.orglDocuments/Consultative/01-035b.pdf (last visited June 14,
2001). FESCO's definition of an ATS is very broad and defines a qualifying system as "an
entity which, without being regulated as an exchange, operates an automated system that
brings together buying and selling interests-in the system and according to rules set by
the system's operator-in a way that forms, or results in, an irrevocable contract." ML at 6.
42. Adopting ATS Release, supra note 7, at 70,859. Any ATS that trades only
government securities is excluded from the scope of Regulation ATS, but other ATSs that
trade other debt securities are subject to the Regulation. The SEC expressed its view that
its concerns about trading equity securities on ATSs, especially as to capacity, integrity
and fair access, apply to trading of fixed income securities in ATSs. Id. at 70,861-62,
70,902.
43. Id. at 70,863.
44. Id. at 70,870; see also id. at 70,866 n.191-92.
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NASD. Any ATS required to publicly display its best priced orders
must also provide to members of the SRO with which it is linked the
ability to effect a transaction with those orders. Further, fees cannot
be set that are inconsistent with the principle of equivalent access.45 If
an ATS accounts for more than twenty percent of trading volume in
any equity security, or twenty percent or more of the volume in any
category of corporate debt or municipal security, during four of the
preceding six months, under Exchange Act Rule 301(b)(5) it must
establish standards for access to its system and apply those standards
fairly to all prospective subscribers.46
Exchange Act Rule 301(b)(6) applies to any ATS that trades
twenty percent or more of the volume in any equity security or any
category of corporate debt or municipal securities during four of the
preceding six months. Any such ATS, among other things, is required
to: (1) Establish reasonable current and future capacity estimates; (2)
conduct periodic capacity stress tests of critical systems; (3) develop
and implement reasonable procedures to monitor systems
development and testing methodology; (4) review the vulnerability of
systems and data center computer operations to internal and external
threats, physical hazards and natural disasters; and (5) establish
adequate contingency and disaster recovery plans.
Any ATS that falls within the registration rule, Rule 3b-16, can
choose to register as a national securities exchange. But the SEC
declined to give anj relief from the obligations of an exchange under
the Exchange Act. Therefore, any ATS choosing to register as an
exchange must be able to enforce compliance by its members and
associated persons with the federal securities laws and rules of the
exchange.49  Further, such an ATS must comply with corporate
governance requirements. At least one director must be
representative of issuers and investors and not associated with any
member or broker-dealer. There must be fair representation of an
exchange's members. 5 The customers of many ATSs are institutions.
This is one reason the SEC previously declined to extend the
definition of an exchange to include them." Nevertheless, in its
rulemaking package, the SEC determined not to grant any relief from
45. Id. at 70,870.
46. Id. at 70,923. The Proposing Release included a right of appeal to the SEC of any
denial of limitation of access. This appeal right was not included in the final rules. Id- at
70,874.
47. Id. at 70,924.
48. Ma2 at 70,880.
49. Ia. at 70,881.
50. Id. at 70,882-84.
51. See Bd. of Trade of the City of Chi. v. SEC, 923 F.2d 1270,1273 (7th Cir. 1991).
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the requirement that all exchange members be registered broker-
dealers. 2
In addition, any ATS choosing to register as an exchange, must
provide fair access for members, sufficient systems capacity to handle
foreseeable trading volume, participate in NMS quotation and
reporting systems and establish trading halt and circuit breaker
rules. 3 For example, a newly registered exchange would be required
to halt trading when neither quotation nor transaction information
could be disseminated. Any securities traded on a registered
exchange must be registered with the SEC and approved for listing on
the exchange. Therefore systems that trade privately placed or
unregistered foreign securities could not register as exchanges.'
In order to level the playing field between registered ATSs and
registered exchanges, and to further innovation, Exchange Act Rule
19b-5 permits pilot systems to operate for two years before filing and
approval by the SEC.5 A pilot trading system is, essentially, a low
volume system operated independently of any other SRO system.
No ATS has yet been able to register as an exchange. The most
serious effort to do so has been that of Archipelago LLC
(Archipelago), an ECN that offers investors anonymous access to the
markets.56 Archipelago filed an application to become an exchange in
August 1999, but this application languishedY Then in August 2000
Archipelago and the Pacific Stock Exchange (PCX) created the
Archipelago Exchange (Arca) for the purpose of trading NYSE,
Nasdaq and American Stock Exchange, Inc. (Amex) stocks in a fully
electronic system." PCX submitted proposed rules for Arca, which
would be operated by Archipelago under PCX's SRO umbrella, but
these rules were opposed by Nasdaq. 9 In fact, ATSs cannot operate
and be regulated like traditional exchanges and for ATSs and
exchanges to compete effectively, either ATSs or exchanges would
have to change their governance and the way they are regulated. But
the SEC seems determined to force all marketplaces into bureaucratic
pigeonholes.
52. Adopting ATS Release, supra note 7, at 70,884.
53. Id. at 70,885-88.
54. Id. at 70,886.
55. Id. at 70,892-93.
56. See Rachel Witmer, Archipelago Begins Trading NYSE, AMEX Stocks on
NASDAQ Intermarket, 32 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), at 1100 (Aug. 14, 2000).
57. See Rachel Witmer, SEC Seeks to Foster Innovation, Unger Says, Responding to
Criticism of Market Regulation, 32 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), at 178 (Feb. 14,2000).
58. See Archipelago, Pacific Exchange Close Deal, Create First Fully Automated U.S.
Exchange, 32 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), at 945 (July 17,2000).
59. Proposed PCXArca Exchange Lacks Adequate Integration into NMS, Nasdaq
Says, 33 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), at 249 (Feb. 19,2001).
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Regulation ATS is a significant NMS initiative, but like many of
the SEC's past programs in this area, it is unclear what will really be
accomplished. Although the SEC expanded the definition of an
exchange from its prior narrow interpretations, it did so to force
ATSs with substantial volume into NMS quotation and transaction
reporting rules, not to change the way in which exchanges operate or
are governed. Although the SEC has long believed that market
transparency is a keystone of the NMS, the argument can be made
that transparency has costs, especially for efficiency and liquidity and
that it may benefit the retail investor, but burden the institutional
investor.' In fact, the SEC has not integrated broker-dealer block
trading desks or single market maker or dealer systems into the ATS-
NMS framework, thus permitting institutional investors some leeway
in keeping their strategies and orders from the marketplace.'
D. SuperMontage and NYSE Direct
The NASD's response to competitive changes in the
marketplace, especially those changes which have been precipitated
by new technologies was the SuperMontage. The NASD claims that
the SuperMontage will improve market transparency, maintain
liquidity, and thwart any threats of fragmentation. 2 The NASD also
believes that the SuperMontage will ultimately benefit investors by
providing them with more market information, reduced spreads and
better executions. Several market makers believe the SuperMontage
is an appropriate response to the ever growing competition among
ECNs, ATSs and traditional exchanges and will create a central order
book for Nasdaq securities.63 Yet ECN giants Archipelago and
Instinet fiercely oppose the proposal, claiming it will stifle
competition and seeks to maintain the NASD's monopolistic power
over the OTC marketplace while Nasdaq is evolving into a for-profit
entity.
It is within this framework that the SEC, after nine amendments,
approved the NASD's SuperMontage Proposal.6' Then SEC
Chairman Levitt stated that the proposal was an adequate response to
60. Letter from Ruben Lee to Jonathan Katz, Secretary, SEC (July 28, 1998).
61. Adopting ATS Release, supra note 7, at 70,851. The reason is that the customers
of a broker-dealer generally keep control over their own orders so the broker-dealer is
unlikely to be viewed as using discretionary methods in handling the order. Id. at 70,850-
51.
62. Richard G. Ketchum, NASD, Inc., Testimony before the House Subcommittee on
Finance and Hazardous Materials on Competition in the New Electronic Market (May 11,
2000).
63. Randal Smith & Greg Ip, Exchanges, Firms Wrestle Over Structure, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 1, 2000, at C1.
64. SuperMontage Adopting Release, supra note 11.
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increased domestic and global competition, providing better and
faster execution and greater market transparency. 65 While Chairman
Levitt admitted that the SuperMontage does not meet all competitive
challenges, and "would be an easier matter if we were at a different
stage in our market's evolution, with the issues of demutualization
and market data dissemination behind us," he also concluded that it
was not the SEC's role to structure markets.66
In general, SuperMontage will turn Nasdaq into more of a
conventional stock exchange as opposed to a network of market
makers by centralizing and displaying more stock quotes.6 7
SuperMontage will modify three areas of the Nasdaq quotation
system: 1) Quote/order collection; 2) quote/order display; and 3)
execution services.' First, the new system will eliminate the
distinction between quotes and orders by allowing participants to
enter multiple quotes/orders at the same or different prices. Second,
SuperMontage will aggregate the system's best priced quotes to
create a participant's best quote as well as display three additional
quotes/orders." Entry of multiple quotes is voluntary. Additional
entries may also be made anonymously. Third, SuperMontage will
automatically execute orders according to a default price/time
algorithm. Participants may also opt for one of three different
algorithms (price/time, price/size/time, or price/time which account
for fees) and may direct their orders to a particular market
participant."
The SuperMontage proposal was very controversial. It
encountered three core criticisms. First, it was asserted that the auto-
execution mechanism was discriminatory because it prioritizes ECN
quotes which charge access fees and UTP Exchange quotes lower
than quotes from other dealers. Second, it was argued that inherent
conflicts of interest exist between the NASD, as regulator, and
Nasdaq, an evolving for-profit entity. And third, critics claimed that
the SuperMontage would have an anticompetitive effect on ATSs.
The price/time algorithm gives lower priority to ECN
quotes/orders which charge access fees for their services, and last
priority for UTP Exchanges. Many ECNs claim that the execution
process ought to ignore access fees because "statistically the price
improvement provided by certain ECNs exceeded the cost of their
65. SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, Opening Statement on NASD's Proposed
SuperMontage and Streamlining the SEC Review Process for SRO Filings (Jan. 10, 2001).
66. Id.
67. Michael Schroeder & Greg Ip, Plan to Upgrade Nasdaq Trading Passes the SEC,
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fees." The SEC conceded that these priority issues were
irreconcilable, but that price priority should trump time priority and
that it was reasonable for an investor to choose an execution method
that gives lower priority to quotes that require access fees.'
Moreover, the amended proposal provides investors with the option
of directing orders to the ECN or market maker of their choice,
regardless of the fees charged. Therefore, if speed is a priority,
investors will request that ECN access fees not be taken into account.
ECNs believes that this model will impede price competition and
investors will not receive the best execution since even the best priced
quotes (minus access fees) would receive lower priorities.
Whether SuperMontage will recapture for Nasdaq trades lost to
ATSs remains to be seen. It is worth noting that despite vociferous
howls from some established ECNs, and a disclaimer by the SEC that
it was using its powers under the NMS provisions of the Exchange
Act to approve SRO rules to structure markets, the SEC approved a
Nasdaq effort to better compete with ATSs. Further, as this Article
will demonstrate, neither Nasdaq nor the NYSE nor ATSs are free to
establish new systems or embark on new business initiatives without
the acquiescence of the SEC. This regulatory power by a government
agency makes it questionable that exchanges can demutualize and
become for-profit public companies without changes in their
regulation by the SEC. But if exchanges become free of the shackles
imposed upon their operations by the NMS provisions of the
Exchange Act, they may no longer be able to operate as SROs.
The NYSE response to the threat of competition from ECNs has
been greater automation. Over ninety percent of NYSE trades are
now handled electronically. 3 NYSE Direct+ is a fully electronic
connection to the point of sale and offers rapid, automatic execution
of limit orders up to 1,099 shares.74 Plans to automate the execution
of anonymous institutional orders will further the NYSE's claim that
it is the biggest ECN in the world.7" Although these initiatives would
appear to cut into the profitability of specialist firms, these firms have
been doing well. Some large securities firms that invested in ENCs a
few years ago are now buying specialist firms.76
71. SuperMontage Adopting Release, supra note 11, at 7.
72 Id.
73. See EXCHANGE PLACES, ECONOMIST GLOBAL MARKETS EQUITY SURVEY, May
5,2001, at 13.
74. See NETWORK NYSE, at http:llwww.nyse.comlpdfs/nysedirect.pdf (last visited
June 14,2001).
75. See INSTITUTIONAL XPRESS, at http:llwww.nyse.comlpdfslixpress3.pdf (last visited
June 14,2001); Exchange Places, supra, note 73.
76. See Ip, supra note 15, at Al; Jeff D. Opdyke, Goldman Boosts Clout In Trading,
VALL ST. J., Jan. 30,2001, at Cl.
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The SEC has paid lip service to competition between and among
marketplaces and it is required to do so when implementing the NMS
provisions of the Exchange Act. Its reaction to the development of
ATSs as marketplaces competing with the NYSE and Nasdaq,
however, has been to design complicated new regulations to force
ATSs into existing market structures. Further, the SEC is too
concerned about fragmentation of the pricing mechanism for equities
to permit unregulated competition between market centers. This may
well be appropriate as a matter of policy, but the model that is
emerging is that of two dominant market centers with ATSs gaining
just enough market share to keep the NYSE and Nasdaq innovative
and honest. This long was the SEC model for the NYSE and regional
exchanges, with Nasdaq as an aggressive interloper. What will
happen to regional exchanges in the new trading markets that are
emerging remains to be seen, but the PLX-Archipelago joint venture
may prove telling. In any event, the SEC's approval of the
SuperMontage and the NYSE's in house ECN experiments suggest
that ATSs will not supplant Nasdaq or the NYSE in the immediate
future.
H. Antitrust Issues
There have long been serious conflicts between competition and
regulation in the securities field. The seminal case attempting to
reconcile these conflicts, Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, set
forth a test for reconciling antitrust laws with securities regulation as
follows: "Repeal [of the antitrust laws] is to be regarded as implied
only if necessary to make the Securities Exchange Act work, and even
then only to the minimum extent necessary."' In this case a
nonmember broker sued the New York Stock Exchange, Inc.
(NYSE) under the Sherman Act after the NYSE ordered the
discontinuance of his wire connections with the offices of NYSE
members without notice, explanation or a hearing. The Court held
that no policy of the Exchange Act was served by this conduct and
therefore the NYSE had acted in violation of the Sherman Act. In
the context of the unfixing of commission rates and a restructuring of
the securities industry over a decade later the Supreme Court
broadened the area in which the antitrust laws may be impliedly
repealed by the securities laws.
In Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc.79 the Court held
that the antitrust laws did not apply to the system of fixed commission
rates then utilized by the stock exchanges because the SEC had
77. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
78. Id. at 357.
79. 422 U.S. 659 (1975).
[Vol. 53
TURNING SEATS INTO SHARES
authority to do away with fixed commissions had it found them
inconsistent with the regulatory structure. Direct and active
supervision by the SEC over rate-fixing by securities exchanges
negated the possibility of antitrust liability for fixed commissions. In
a second case decided the same year the Court found that the SEC
had not exercised the same degree of supervision with regard to the
secondary trading of mutual funds, but read the applicable legislative
history as granting to the SEC the informed administrative judgement
to do so.' The 1975 Act amendments, passed in the same year as
these cases, made clear that the SEC's role in passing on exchange or
other SRO rules must include an evaluation of the anti-competitive
aspect of such rules. Several new powers for and limitations on the
SEC were added to the Exchange Act with respect to the
consideration of competitive questions.
Within one year after the effective date of the statute, the SEC
was required to determine whether the rules of any national securities
exchange or registered securities association complied with the
Exchange Act. Thereafter, proposed rule changes of exchanges and
associations were required to be subjected to prior rulemaking
procedures by the SEC and could not take effect without an SEC
finding that such rule was consistent with the Exchange Act." These
provisions effectively required the SEC to take competition into
consideration in reviewing all existing and any new exchange or
association rules. In addition, fixed commission rates were effectively
outlawed although the SEC was given the authority to allow
"reasonable" fixed rates prior to November 1, 1976 if found to be in
the public interest.' The SEC was also instructed to review and
presumably eliminate off board trading bans of the exchanges, but as
will be explained below, these rules were not finally eliminated until
May 2000.
Although the SEC pushed for multiple trading of equities for
many years, and believed multiple trading was endorsed by the 1975
Act amendments, in the mid-1970s, the SEC nevertheless discouraged
multiple trading of options on more than one exchange because of
concerns over manipulative activity!' However, in 1989 the SEC
80. United States v. NASD, Inc., 422 U.S. 694 (1975).
81. Exchange Act § 19(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78s (2000). See also Notice of Rulemaking
Proceeding, Exchange Act Release No. 34-11,628, 40 Fed. Reg. 41,808 (Sept. 9,1975).
82. Announcement of the Adoption of Rule 19b-3 Under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 34-11,203,40 Fed. Reg. 7394 (Jan. 23, 1975). See also
Announcement of the Adoption of Rule 17a-20 and Related Form X-17A-20 Under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 34-11,395, 40 Fed. Reg.
20,073 (May 8, 1975).
83. See SEC Proposal Would End Prohibition on Multiple Exchange Trading of
Options, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), at 906 (June 19, 1987).
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permitted multiple options trading.' Some years later the
Department of Justice investigated and brought a class action
charging price-fixing in the options markets. This case was against
exchanges that had exclusive options and certain of the specialists,
market makers and floor brokers which allegedly entered into an
unlawful conspiracy to refrain from the multiple trading of options
and to refuse to integrate the options markets leading to spreads at
excessive levels.8 This case and a companion SEC case have since
been settled." A companion private class action case was also settled
as to some parties, but on a motion for summary judgment by the
remaining parties, was dismissed on the basis of implicit repeal due to
SEC regulation of the options-listing arena. This decision left the
question of whether options exchanges should enjoy a monopoly with
respect to the listing of a particular option or be permitted or
required to compete in the trading of the same options squarely in the
lap of the SEC.
Of much greater importance to the future shape of the securities
markets was a Department of Justice and SEC investigation into
market maker spreads on Nasdaq. A pricing convention by which
most Nasdaq stocks were quoted in even eighths was declared
illegal.' As a result, stocks began to be quoted and traded on stock
exchanges and Nasdaq in smaller increments. Furthermore, this
proved but a prelude to decimalization in which stocks could be
traded in much smaller increments.' Just as prodding by the
Department of Justice was necessary to unfix commission rates,
action by the Department of Justice was necessary to narrow trading
spreads. This process of unfixing trading spreads is ongoing.
84. 17 C.F.R. § 240 (1999). See Multiple Trading of Standardized Options, Exchange
Act Release No. 34-26,870, 54 Fed. Reg. 23,963 (June 5,1989).
85. Press Release, Dept. of Justice, Justice Dept. Files Suit Challenging
Anticompetitive Agreement Among Options Exchanges (Sept. 11, 2000), at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press-release/2000/6452.htm.
86. See Options Market: Four U.S. Options Exchanges Settle Charges by SEC, Justice
of Anticompetitive Conduct, 32 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (BNA), at 1226 (Sept. 18,2000).
87. See In re: Stock Exch. Option Trading Antitrust Litig., 2001 WL 128325 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 15, 2001). See also, In re: Stock Exch. Options Trading Antitrust Litig., 2001 WL
423039 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2001). This case is of interest now that the SEC will also
regulate single stock futures which will compete with exchange traded options. See SEC,
CFTC Propose Joint Rules For Trading of New 'Security Futures,' 33 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA), at 742 (May 14,2001).
88. See Report Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Regarding the NASD and the Nasdaq Market, Exchange Act Release No. 37,542, 62
S.E.C. Doe. 1385 (Aug. 8, 1996).
89. E. S. Browning, Journal Goes "Decimal" With Nasdaq Tables-NYSE List Will
Follow In Break With Fractions, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 2000, at Cl; Greg Ip & Patrick
McGeehan, Big Board Votes Trades In Decimals, WALL ST. J., June 6,1997, at Cl.
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Furthermore, ECNs are generating an onslaught of competitive
threats to the former monopoly type powers of exchanges.
Among these monopoly type powers was the trading of securities
in issuers that determined to list on the exchange. Although as far
back as the Multiple Trading Case in 1941' the SEC attempted to
prevent exchanges from exercising a monopoly in the trading of an
issuer's securities, the NYSE's off-board trading rule, Rules 390,91
effectively prevented serious competition among exchanges in dually
listed stocks. The first significant attack on the monopolization of
trading in the stock of a listed issuer was Exchange Act Rule 19c-3
which permitted exchange members to trade off-board as agent for
customers, except in agency crosses, and abolished off-board trading
restrictions as to stocks listed after April 26, 1979.9? In recent years,
competition to exchange trading monopolies has come from ECNs or
ATSs. The proliferation of these electronic marketplaces has forced
the SEC to confront numerous market structure issues.
IH.The NMS Mandate
A. The Securities Acts Amendments of 1975
The 1975 Act amendments imposed much more oversight of
exchanges by the SEC and laid the foundation for the establishment
of a national market system (NMS). Without mandating specific
components of the NMS or even defining the term, Congress vested
the SEC with broad flexible authority to design, implement and
regulate the trading markets. The purposes and goals of this
legislation are set forth in Section 11A(a)(1) of the Exchange Act as
follows:
(a)(1) The Congress finds that-
(A) The securities markets are an important national asset
which must be preserved and strengthened.
(B) New data processing and communications techniques
create the opportunity for more efficient and effective market
operations.
(C) It is in the public interest and appropriate for the
protection of investors and the maintenance of fair and orderly
markets to assure-
90. In the Matter of the Rules of the New York Stock Exchange, Exchange Act
Release No. 3033, 10 S.E.C. Doc. 270 (Oct. 4, 1941).
91. Order Approving Proposed Change To Rescind Exchange Rule 390 Exchange Act
Release No. 34-42,758,65 Fed. Reg. 30,175 (May 10, 2000).
92. Off-Board Trading Restrictions, Exchange Act Release No. 34-16888,45 Fed. Reg.
41125 (June 8, 1980); Off-Board Trading Restrictions, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
16889, 45 Fed. Reg. 41156 (June 8, 1980).
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(i) economically efficient execution of securities
transactions;
(ii) fair competition among brokers and dealers, among
exchange markets, and between exchange markets and
markets other than exchange markets;
(iii) the availability to brokers, dealers, and investors of
information with respect to quotations for and
transactions in securities;
(iv) the practicability of brokers executing investors'
orders in the best market; and
(v) an opportunity, consistent with the provisions of
clauses (i) and (iv) of this subparagraph, for investors'
orders to be executed without the participation of a
dealer.
(D) The linking of all markets for qualified securities through
communication and data processing facilities will foster
efficiency, enhance competition, increase the information
available to brokers, dealers and investors, facilitate the
offsetting of investors' orders and contribute to best execution
of such orders.9 3
The 1975 Act amendments were precipitated by the unfixing of
commission rates and the back office paperwork crisis and
disintermediation that resulted from the onset of freely negotiated
rates. Competitive challenges to the hegemony of the NYSE were
fragmenting the markets and so there were concerns about the
integrity of the pricing mechanism for equities and the best execution
of customers' orders. This background is important to an
understanding of current market structure issues because current
issues are arising from a similar disintermediation.
B. NMS Policy Statements
A recent book advocates that governments withdraw from the
task of mandatory securities market structure and let market forces
shape trading platforms.94 While the SEC is unlikely to accede to this
advice, and probably could not do so given the NMS provisions of the
Exchange Act, the SEC's record of accomplishments is skimpy in
realizing its vision of a NMS articulated in 1978.
93. 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1 (a). See generally Donald L. Calvin, The National Market
System: A Successful Adventure in Industry Self-Improvement, 70 VA. L. REV. 785 (1984);
Milton Cohen, The National Market System-A Modest Proposal, 46 GEO. IWASH. L.
REV. 743 (1978); Norman Poser, Restructuring the Stock Market: A Critical Look at the
SEC's National Market System, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 883 (1981); Michael J. Simon & Robert
L.D. Colby, The National Market System for Over-the-Counter Stocks, 55 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 17 (1986).
94. RUBEN LEE, WHAT Is AN EXCHANGE? THE AUTOMATION, MANAGEMENT,
AND REGULATION OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 260-61,264-65,308-09 (1998).
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In a 1978 Policy Statement, the SEC asserted that Congress
supported three major principles when directing the SEC to facilitate
the development of the NMS. These were: (1) Creating an ideal
auction type market by implementing a nationwide system according
to price and time priority for all limit orders of public investors over
all professional orders; (2) the types of securities qualified to be
included in a national market system should depend primarily on
their characteristics rather than where they were traded; and (3) a
refusal to achieve a nationwide centralized auction-type market for
qualified securities involving abolition of over-the-counter trading in
listed securities.95 Competitive forces, to the extent feasible, were to
shape the markets."' The major problems to which the ideas of the
NMS were addressed were those arising from market fragmentation
or "the existence of multiple, geographically separated forums in
which trading in the same security occurs and from
institutionalization of the markets."'
In a Notice of Intent to engage in rulemaking, the SEC expressed
views as to those initiatives which it believed had to be taken over the
next year (that is, before January 1979) to facilitate the establishment
of a national market system. The first initiative was taken
simultaneously with the SEC's National Market System Release,
namely the adoption of Rule llAc-1-1, designed to facilitate the
prompt development of a composite quotation system by improving
the quality and reliability of quotation information made available to
securities information vendors by exchanges and third market
makers."
The second initiative was the development of comprehensive
market linkage and order routing systems. This linkage was created
by the Intermarket Trading System (ITS), which initially was a
quotation link between all national securities exchanges, and was then
linked to the NASD's Computer Assisted Execution System
(CAES).99 The SEC has expressed the view that ITS has become
anticompetitive and that quotes of electronic communications
networks (ECNs) should be included in a consolidated quote."°
95. Development of a National Market System, Exchange Act Release No. 14,416, 43
Fed. Reg. 4354 (Feb. 1, 1978).
96. Id. at 17.
97. Id.
98. See Dissemination of Quotations for Reported Securities, Exchange Act Release
No. 14,415, 43 Fed. Reg. 4342 (Feb. 1, 1978) [hereinafter Dissemination of Quotations
Release].
99. See Intermarket Trading System, Exchange Act Release No. 18,713, 47 Fed. Reg.
20,413 (May 12, 1982); In the matter of American Stock Exchange, Inc., et. al., Exchange
Act Release No. 19,456,48 Fed. Reg. 4938 (Jan. 27,1983).
100. See Disclosure of Order Routing and Execution Practices, Exchange Act Release
No. 43,084, 65 Fed Reg. 48,406, at 48,420 (Aug. 6, 2000) [hereinafter Disclosure Rules
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ATSs and ECNs that are not exchanges do not have access to the
ITS.'0 ' This raises a concern about price discovery efficiency and an
argument that every exchange, ATS and ECN should be playing by
the same rules."° Frustrated critics of the current system note that the
United States is the only major country without an electronic stock
exchange.03 Instinet's CEO, recommends following Europe's lead
and opening access to prevent fragmentation.' 4
A White Paper issued by several large NYSE member firms in
February 2000 asserted that in order to make the ITS a "super
national market system (NMS), much must be done, including:
opening access to all qualified market participants; making
governance more democratic and streamlined; updating technology,
ensuring efficient order-routing; and providing an effective dispute
resolution mechanism.' Also, mandatory price-time priority to
ensure automatic execution must be built into the system."
The third basic principle upon which the 1978 SEC believed an
NMS must be based was the assurance that all agency orders in NMS
securities, regardless of location, receive the benefit of auction-type
trading protections. To that end, the SEC recommended that
concerned self-regulatory organizations develop and implement a
central limit order book (CLOB) for public agency orders. To this
day, no such CLOB has been developed and it remains a
controversial idea. Some, including SEC Chairman Levitt, have
advocated a CLOB for all customer orders."O A CLOB is a "central
repository" that allows all market participants to see prices for a
Release]. See Deborah Lose & Greg Ip, SEC Demands Rule Changes for System That
Links Nation's Stock Exchanges, WALL ST. J., May 29, 1997, at C22. The SEC also
proposed that the ITS Plan be changed to require a two-thirds supermajority vote for
amendments to the plan instead of a unanimous vote. Proposed Rules to Amend the
Intermarket Trading System Plan to Expand the ITS Computer Assisted Execution
System Linkage to All Listed Securities and to Eliminate Unanimous Vote Provision,
Exchange Act Release No. 40,260 (July 24,1998).
101. Rachel Witmer, SEC Seeks to Foster Innovation Unger Says, Responding to




105. Responding to Chairman Levitt's Call: A Plan for Achieving a True National
Market System (Feb. 29, 2000), at http:linteractive.wsj.comlarticles/
SB951781063229264679.htm [hereinafter Large Firm White Paper]; see Michael Schroeder
& Randall Smith, Sweeping Change in Market Structure Sought-Major Firms Propose
Central Order System and Single Regulator, WALL ST. J., Feb. 29, 2000, at Cl; Five Wall
Street Firms' Vision Of A Centralized Market, 32 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), at 277
(March 6,2000).
106. Large Firm White Paper, supra note 105.
107. See Rachel Witmer, SEC Proposes Rescission of NYSE Rule 390, Seeks Input on
Market Fragmentation Issues, 32 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), at 241 (Feb. 28, 2000).
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security simultaneously. This proposal thwarts price fragmentation
and promotes price transparency. There is a vigorous debate as to
whether a CLOB is the answer to this issue. Many oppose the CLOB
although it would improve broker dealer and ATSs market
positions.' °9 The SEC has not taken an official current position on
whether the CLOB would better serve the interest of investor
protection.1 '
In 1979, the SEC next proposed that a decision was required
concerning off-board trading prohibitions. Thereafter, in 1980, the
SEC amended Exchange Act Rule 19c-1 and adopted Rule 19c-3,
which permitted exchange members to trade off-board as agent for
customers, except in agency crosses, and abolished off-board trading
restrictions as to stocks listed after April 26, 1979."1 However,
remaining off-board trading restrictions were not removed until May
2000.
The fifth pillar of the SEC's vision of a national market system in
1979 was a consolidated transaction reporting system. This pillar was
then constructed pursuant to a variety of national market system
plans pursuant to Exchange Act Rules 11A3-1, 1lAc-1, l1Acl-2 and
11A3-2 by the Consolidated Tape Association (CTA) and related
committees.'
Finally, the SEC explained that it was necessary to define
securities qualified to trade in the national market system and it then
proceeded to do so.' A variety of other matters were also briefly
addressed in the 1979 National Market System Release including
institutional trading prohibitions, self-regulatory organization
governance and surveillance of national market system facilities, and
clearance and settlement issues. Of overriding policy concern,
however, was the problem of fostering competition without
fragmentation of the market due to internalization by member firms.
108. Id.
109. See Witmer, supra note 107, at 241.
110. Id.
ll. Id.
112. Dissemination and Display of Transaction Reports, Last Sale Data and Quotation
Information, Exchange Act Release No. 16-590, 45 Fed. Reg. 12,391 (Feb. 26, 1980);
Dissemination of Quotations Release, supra note 98. See Regulation of Market
Information Fees and Revenues, Exchange Act Release No. 42-208, 64 Fed. Reg. 70,613
(Dec. 17, 1999) [hereinafter SEC Concept Release on Fees].
113. Designation of National Market System Securities, Exchange Act Release No.
17,549,46 Fed. Reg. 13,992 (Feb. 17, 1981). For the potential this gave the SEC to impose
governance standard on listed issues, see Roberta S. Karmel, Qualitative Standards for
"Qualified Securities". SEC Regulation of Voting Rights, 36 CATH. UNIV. L. REV. 809




The most significant of the many complex market issues
currently under consideration is resolution of the tension between
trading competition and centrality of the price setting mechanism for
equities. The SEC set forth this issue and the many sub-issues
involved in its Request for Comment on Issues Relating to Market
Fragmentation (SEC Request for Comments). '14 After reviewing the
comments submitted in response to this release, the SEC recently
proposed two new rules to improve public disclosure of order routing
and execution practices."'
Another important market structure issue is resolution of the
tension between liquidity and transparency. This issue, among others,
was addressed in the Report of the Special Committee on Market
Structure, Governance and Ownership of the New York Stock
Exchange, Inc. (NYSE Report)."6 To some extent, this NYSE
Report was a response to the Large Firm White Paper concerning the
issue of market fragmentation.17 The NYSE Report also was
prompted by the SEC's Concept Release on Market Information
Fees and Revenues."' In a further effort to come to grips with the
issues of price transparency and consolidated market information and
determining how market information fees should be determined, the
SEC established an Advisory Committee on Market Information on
July 25, 2000.19
Fragmentation occurs when investor order flow is directed to
different markets that are not connected or are ineffectively
connected."" Internalization and payment for order flow are among
the causes of fragmentation. These questionable practices have been
under SEC scrutiny for some time, but the SEC has been reluctant to
outlaw them because they have exerted pressure on the NYSE and
Nasdaq to reduce trading costs. Whether fragmentation is a serious
current problem in the securities markets is a subject of some debate.
The Large Firm White Paper asserted that fragmentation is a reality
114. See Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change by
the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. to Rescind Exchange Rule 390; Commission Request
for Comment on Issues Relating to Market Fragmentation, Exchange Act Release No.
42,450, 65 Fed. Reg. 10,577 (Feb. 23, 2000) [hereinafter SEC Request for Comment on
Fragmentation].
115. Disclosure Rules Release, supra note 100.
116. SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON MARKET STRUCTURE, GOVERNANCE AND
OWNERSHIP, MARKET STRUCTURE REPORT OF THE NYSE (March 23,2000), available at
http:/wvww.nyse.comlpdfslmarketstructure.pdf [hereinafter NYSE Report].
117. See Large Firm White Paper, supra note 105.
118. SEC Concept Release on Fees, supra note 112.
119. See Law School Dean to Chair Advisory Panel on Market Information, 32 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), at 1331 (Oct. 2,2000).
120. See Large Firm White Paper, supra note 105, at 3.
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and that it will worsen when ENCs register as exchanges and when
NYSE off-board trading restrictions are removed."' The NYSE also
claimed that the rescission of Rule 390 would exacerbate
fragmentation to the detriment of investors." Both the Large Firm
White Paper and the NYSE Report blamed inadequacies in the ITS
for some market structure problems, but their solutions were quite
different.
The Large Firm White Paper urged a completely reformed
market linkage system, which would include all qualifying ECNs and
would have a new governance structure including representatives
from all industry participants so that the NYSE and Nasdaq would no
longer be in a position to regulate their ECN competitors.Y The
Large Firm White Paper also recommended the adoption of a CLOB,
that is an automatic price/time priority rule.' These reforms would
help to connect fragmented liquidity pools while preserving the
ability of the large firms to internalize retail executions. The NASD
has asserted that the SuperMontage is an alternative solution to
fragmentation, and better than a CLOB. Critics of SuperMontage
claim it is a CLOBY.
The NYSE Report asserted that developments in
communications technology have eliminated the need for an
intermarket order-routing system such as ITS and suggested that ITS
be abolished. 6 Recognizing, however, that the SEC was unlikely to
agree, the NYSE Report argued that the ITS should continue to
require that participants be SROs1V This would compel broker-
dealers, including ECNs that do not register as exchanges pursuant to
Regulation ATS, to link to ITS only through an SRO participating in
the ITS plan. Further, the NYSE Report opposed the adoption of a
CLOB, which it defined as a "single, national, order-driven
intermarket linkage requiring submission of all customer limit orders
for automatic matching based upon price-time priority."' ' The
NYSE Report argued that a CLOB eliminates, without replacing, the
price discovery that occurs in the crowd on the NYSE floor and
questioned whether a CLOB would attract meaningful institutional
order flow. The NYSE Report also recommended that the NYSE not
facilitate internationalization of customer orders in the absence of
121. Id. at 3-4.
122. See SEC Request for Comment on Fragmentation, supra note 114, at 10,578.
123. Large Firm White Paper supra note 105, at 11-15.
124. Id. at 15-25.
125. See, e.g., Congressional Testimony of Kevin Foley, President and CEO, Tradebook
LLC, March 22,2000.
126. See NYSE Report, supra note 116, at 42.
127. Id at 43.
128. Id at 27.
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opportunities for price improvement."29 Recently, the SEC reiterated
its concern about the potential for internalization and payment for
order flow arrangements to interfere with order interaction and the
display of aggressively priced quotations"
ECNs and their defenders argue that the equity markets are not
fragmented and that competition between market centers-ECNs
and exchanges-should make the pricing mechanisms efficient and
fair."' Both ECNs and the regional stock exchanges (which may have
the most to lose in the competition for order flow and executions)
oppose a CLOB as anticompetitive and likewise opposed the
SuperMontage.' This debate has pitted the interests of the large
wire houses wishing to internalize order flow against the interests of
exchanges and other markets. The effect decimalization will have on
execution costs and profits as well as the continued popularity of limit
orders is unknown. Accordingly, the timing has not been propitious
for the SEC to mandate a CLOB that is opposed by large segments of
the securities industry, and the SEC has so concluded.3 '
The adoption of a CLOB was not the only idea put forth by the
SEC in its Request for Comment on market fragmentation. Other
options suggested by the SEC were greater disclosure by market
centers and brokers concerning trade execution and order routing;
restrictions on internalization and payment for order flow;
requirements for exposure of market orders to price competition; and
intermarket prohibitions against market makers trading ahead of
previously displayed and accessible investor limit orders." The SEC
is now following up on all of these ideas.
Rule llAcl-5, adopted at the end of 2000, requires market
centers that trade national market system securities to make available
to the public monthly electronic reports that include uniform
statistical measures of execution quality on a security-by-security
basis. 35 Rule 1lAcl-6 requires broker-dealers that route orders on
behalf of customers to make publicly available quarterly reports that
describe their order routing practices and disclose the venues to
129. Id. at 36-40.
130. Disclosure Rules Release, supra note 100, at 48,407.
131. See Mark Klock, The SEC's New Regulation ATS: Placing the Myth of Market
Fragmentation Ahead of Economic Theory and Evidence, 51 FLA. L. REV. 753 (1999); see
also Matthew Andresen, Don't CLOBber ECNs, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2000, at A48;
Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Wall Street Fuddy Duddies CLOBber the Future, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 8, 2000, at A23.
132. See Market Fragmentation Issue Reduced to CLOB Comments, 3 Securities
Regulatory Update (CCH), at I (June 12,2000).
133. Disclosure Rules Release, supra note 100, at 48,407.
134. SEC Request for Comment on Fragmentation, supra note 114, at 10,586.
135. 17 C.F.R. § 240.11Acl-5.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53
TURNING SEATS INTO SHARES
which customer orders are routed for execution.136 There is an
ongoing staff study on order execution quality which could serve as a
basis for restricting internalization and payment for order flow
arrangements. 7
Industry focus on the merits of a CLOB rather than the SEC's
other suggestions for reducing fragmentation is understandable since
currently two-thirds of all orders on Nasdaq and system orders on the
NYSE are limit orders."l3 The SEC believes that limit orders narrow
spreads, increase liquidity and promote the ability of investors to
trade without the intervention of a dealer.139 However, the increased
chances of missing limit order executions after decimalization may
change investor behavior and make the debate over a CLOB
irrelevant. The SEC has suggested that after decimalization it may
prevent market makers from stepping ahead of customer limit orders
at a penny in order to continue to encourage limit orders."4 However,
the already complicated regulations for limit order display and
handling perhaps defy compliance.'41
D. Market Data
Current and contemplated changes in market structure also have
thrown into question arrangements for disseminating and charging for
market information. In 1999, the SEC issued a Concept Release on
Market Information Fees and Revenues which indicated that the SEC
was considering effecting serious changes in the way in which
exchanges and other markets could charge for market information.
The SEC seemed to envision cost-based accounting with respect to
the production of market information in order to determine whether
the fees for the provision of such information are reasonable.
Although the SEC Concept Release on Fees set forth the SEC's
belief that market information fees are an appropriate part of SRO
funding, it questioned whether the cost of member regulation should
be included in the computation of what market information costs.
4 2
Further, the SEC suggested that conversion of exchanges to for-profit
companies and the proliferation of alternative trading markets may
require greater government interference in the way in which SRO
136. 17 C.F.R. § 240.11Acl-6.
137. Disclosure Rules Release, supra note 100, at 48,407. On the other hand,
decimalization may lead to the demise of payment for order flow.
138. SEC Special Study: Report Concerning Display of Customer Limit Orders, Fed.
See. L. REP. (CCH) 86,306, at 83,401 (May 4,2000) [hereinafter Special Study].
139. Id.
140. Disclosure Rules Release, supra note 100, at 48,420.
141. See Special Study, supra note 138.
142. SEC Concept Release on Fees, supra note 112, at 70,627.
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information processors are governed as well as how they charge for
market information.
It seems curious that at a time when there are more, rather than
fewer, competing markets for equity trading the SEC is considering
the imposition of utility rate style regulation for market information.
In response to the SEC Concept Release, the NYSE determined to
withdraw from the CTA and lambasted the idea of cost-based rate
regulation for market data fees. 143 Further, the NYSE expressed the
view that if it charged more for its data, it could charge less for listings
and transactions.! Because of the complexity of the issues, the SEC
set up an Advisory Committee on Market Information to deal with
numerous contentious issues.'45
Under its charter, the Advisory Committee was asked to address
the value of transparency to the markets; the impact of decimalization
and electronic quotes on transparency; the merits of consolidated
market information; alternative models for collecting and distributing
market information; the determination and evaluation of market data
feed; and the administration and governance of joint market
information plans.146
Prior to the 1970s, there was no systematic or government
regulated arrangement concerning the dissemination of market
information and little, if any, market information was accessible.
Relying on the so called "ticker" cases (early Supreme Court cases
which examined an exchange's interest and right to control and sell
market information), exchanges and exchange members claimed that
because they had a proprietary right in the market information their
services generated, they could control what information would be
generated, to whom it was generated, and at what cost.47 The NYSE,
for example, "severely restricted public access to market information,
particularly its quotations."'4 8 Thus, prior to the 1970s, "market
information, to the extent it was disseminated, was not consolidated,
and the largest market[s] refused to provide public access to itsquotations." '' 9
143. NYSE Proposes Competitive Model for Market-Data Dissemination, THE
EXCHANGE (NYSE), June 2000, at 5.
144. See The Battle for Efficient Markets, ECONOMIST, June 17,2000, at 70.
145. See, supra note 119.
146. REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITrEE ON MARKET INFORMATION 2 (Sept. 14,
2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/marketinfo/finalreport.htm
[hereinafter REPORT ON MARKET INFORMATION].
147. SEC Concept Release on Fees, supra note 112.
148. 1&
149. Id. See also Amex Statement, "It is long-standing and clearly established that the
Exchange has a proprietary right in its transaction data and quotation information. It is
not clear from the terms of the proposed Rules whether or to the extent to which they
might impinge on the Exchange's right." Id. at 70,620. See also NYSE Statement, "It has
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One aim of the NMS provisions of the Exchange Act was to
influence greater dissemination of consolidated market information
and unrestricted public access to such information.15 ° In 1972 the
Commission adopted rules to provide for the consolidated reporting
of transactions and quotations by SROs.5' The Commission found
SROs to be in the best position to disseminate this information
because of their concurrent status as regulators. The rule did not
prevent exchanges from charging reasonable fees for their market
data and "[iun this regard, revenues derived from market information
fees already were an important source of SRO funding."15 2
The statutory standard under the 1975 Amendments mandates
that the terms under which market information is available must be
fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory.'53 Congress envisioned that
exclusive processors of market information would function as a public
utility-a completely neutral party amonf all market participants-
under SEC overview and regulation. ' In contrast to the
Commission's policies regarding fixed commission rates, Congress did
not adopt a cost of service or "ratemaking" approach to the fees
charged for market data. Instead, the 1975 Amendments give the
SEC considerable flexibility in determining the reasonableness and
fairness of market fees. This flexibility, coupled with a radically
changing market structure, however, spurred recent SEC inquires
into what is fair and reasonable.'
always been the position of the Exchange that NYSE bid-asked quotations on a
continuous basis are a prerogative of Exchange membership." I at 70,620.
150. SEC Concept Release on Fees, supra note 112.
151. Id The NYSE claimed that the Commission had exceeded their rule making
authority under Section 17(a) and 23(a) of the Securities Exchange Act and deprived them
of their property.
152. Id
153. Sections 11A(c)(1)(C), 11A(c)(1)(D), and 6(b)(4) and 15A(b)(5); SEC Concept
Release on Fees, supra note 112.
154. SEC Concept Release on Fees, supra note 112. Any securities information
processor (SIP) which is an exclusive processor must be registered with the Commission.
Section 11A(b)(1).
155. The Commission has reviewed market information fee structures on two occasions.
First, in 1978, the Commission reviewed OPRA's proposal to institute an access fee on
vendors based on costs associated with its new consolidated reporting system. SEC
Concept Release on Fees, supra note 112. Nevertheless, the Commission refused to
evaluate the reasonableness of the fee, simply finding that some form of access fee may be
charged. Second, in 1984, in a dispute involving the NASD and Instinet, the Commission
found that a "proposed NASD fee for quotation information represented an unwarranted
denial of access, primarily because the NASD had failed to submit an adequate cost-based
justification for its proposed fee." Id at 70,622. However, the Commission emphasized
"that it was the peculiar competitive context of the proceedings that led to its decision to
require a strict, cost-based justification." Id. at 70,623. The Commission stated the
following:
Because Instinet seeks to distribute certain NASDAQ quotation information in
January 2002]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
The Report on Market Data endorsed transparency and
consolidated market data as core elements of the NMS, and a
majority of the Advisory Committee favored retention of the Display
Rule, Rule 1lAcl-2, which requires vendors and broker-dealers to
provide a consolidated display of last sale transaction reports and
quotations from all reporting market centers.'56 The SEC's proposal
for a cost based rate making standard for market data fees was
emphatically rejected, but no alternative new system for reviewing
rates was recommended.'57
Initially, Nasdaq and the NYSE had very different visions
concerning the future of market data fees. Nasdaq proposed two
alternatives to the current consolidation structure. Under a
"market choice" alternative, participants could choose whether to
participate in any NMS plan and submit data to the plan's exclusive
processor. Otherwise, each exchange and SRO could make its data
available to nonexclusive or competing processors, or other market
data vendors independently. Additionally, "exchanges could
negotiate separately for the sale of that information plus enhanced
information to market data vendors, broker-dealers, and subscribers."
The second alternative, a "single consolidator", would operate as a
public utility, jointly administered, and subject to SEC oversight.
Although participants would be required to make its last sale and
BBO information available, each exchange and SRO could
independently sell their enhanced market information. Under a
"single consolidator" alternative, Nasdaq also recommended
amending the rule requiring unanimous consent for all NMS plan
amendments. The NYSE announced plans to withdraw from the
Consolidated Tape Association (CTA), objecting to the CTA as a
"single-source monopoly" as well as to the SEC's plans to engage in
rate making with respect to market data.'5 9
competition with the NASD, which is an exclusive processor of that information,
the proposed fees must be cost-based and calculated by allocating the percentage
of system use of each quotation service offered by the NASD, to ensure the
neutrality and reasonableness of the NASD's charged to Instinet and its
subscribers. Id. at 70,623.
156. SEC Concept Release on Fees, supra note 112, at 70,613, 70,618-23.
157. Id. at 70,628.
158. THE NASDAQ STOCK MARKET, NEW APPROACHES TO MARKET INFORMATION,
SUBMISSION TO SEC MARKET DATA ADVISORY COMMITrEE (Nasdaq White Paper)
(Feb. 19,2001), available at http://www.fisd.net/news/sec__nasdaq0022101sub.pdf.
159. See Greg Ip, NYSE Tells Regulators It Wants to Quit Stock-Data Distribution
Organization, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 2000, at C8. See also Memorandum from the New
York Stock Exchange, Recommendation for an Alternative Model, submitted to the
Federal Advisory Committee on Market Information (Dec. 1, 2000), available at
http:lwww.sec.gov/divisions/marketreglmarketinfo/nysemi.htm.
[Vol. 53
The Report on Market Data recommended that the SEC should
permit a new system of competing consolidators to evolve from the
current unitary model of the CTA, so that each market center would
be permitted to sell its market information to any number of
competing consolidators, which in turn could sell to vendors and
subscribers. ' 6° Further, if the SEC does not adopt a competing
consolidator model, the Report on Market Data recommends that an
information processor be selected by competitive bidding and
governance be broadened through a nonvoting advisory committee.6
E. The Future of the NMS
The fissures within the securities industry with regard to market
structure are longstanding. Further, it is questionable whether the
problems of adjusting to changes in the trading environment for
equities due to technological and competitive pressures should be
addressed by more market regulation by the SEC at this time.
Perhaps consideration should be given to dismantling the NMS, or at
least seriously deregulating an administrative structure designed in
the 1970s to solve the problems of adjustment by a quasi-monopoly to
the unfixing of commission rates in the context of a securities industry
in serious financial and operational difficulty.
Prior to the 1975 Act amendments, the unfixing of commission
rates was forced by numerous rebative practices and the formation of
broker-dealers solely for the purpose of recapturing commissions.
Similarly, in recent years, pressure to reduce trading spreads has been
forced by payment for order flow and internationalization. In 1975
and again today competitive threats to traditional stock exchanges
have been attacked for fragmenting the price discovery mechanism
for equities. What should the role of the SEC be in this struggle? On
the one hand, the SEC is concerned about encouraging competition
and lowering transaction costs, which is accomplished by a single
trading market. On the other hand, the SEC also is concerned about
maintaining orderly and liquid markets, which is accomplished by a
single trading market. Although the SEC endeavors to foster
competition with the dominant markets-the NYSE and Nasdaq-
the SEC also worries about fragmentation. Unfortunately, these
goals tend to be conflicting and the Exchange Act does not provide
the SEC with clear guidelines for reconciling these conflicts. The
SEC has never fully trusted competition as a market regulator, but
160. REPORT ON MARKET INFORMATION, supra note 146, at 2-3. A minority of the
Advisory Committee, including the Amex, voted to retain the existing model and another
minority composed of ECNs viewed the elimination of the Display Rule, Rule llAcl-2,
necessary for a system of competing consolidators. Id. at 49 nn. 237-38.
161. IdL at 54-55.
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rather, has preferred regulation to ensure that the markets are
transparent and fair, but not limited to a single monopoly
marketplace.
In the past, the SEC has been able to slough off some of the
more difficult NMS decisions to the securities industry by allowing
SROs to come up with such solutions as the ITS and CTA. New
competitors such as ECNs and shifting alignments on market
structure issues are raising serious questions, however, about the
future of SRO structures and decision making for these industry plans
and even long standing self-regulation by the stock and commodity
exchanges. Further, if exchanges demutualize, their role as SROs for
the NMS will have to be reconsidered.
IV.Background and History of Self-Regulation
A. Stock Exchanges
A major market structure issue currently confronting the SEC is
the future of self-regulation, which has been addressed by a special
committee of the Securities Industry Association (SIA).' 2 Prior to
the enactment of the Exchange Act stock exchanges were private
membership organizations under state law. When the federal
securities laws were passed, stock exchanges were required to register
with the SEC.' 63 The SEC thus obtained oversight authority over
stock exchanges, but the stock exchanges continued to have
rulemaking and regulatory authority with respect to their members,
their trading markets and their listed companies.
Before 1934 no analogue to stock exchanges for the over-the-
counter (OTC) market existed, but in 1938 Congress passed the
Maloney Act to establish a framework for an OTC self-regulatory
organization (SRO).' 6' Only one such association, the NASD exists
for OTC brokers and dealers. Although the NASD is for all intents
and purposes a stock exchange,' 6 it continues to be called and
162. SIA, REINVENTING SELF-REGULATION: WHITE PAPER FOR THE SECURITIES
INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION'S AD Hoc COMMITrEE ON REGULATORY IMPLICATIONS OF
DE-MUTUALIZATION 5 (Jan. 5,2000) [hereinafter SIA WHITE PAPER].
163. Exchange Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1994).
164. Exchange Act § 15A.
165. See Adopting ATS Release, supra note 7, at 70,852. Nasdaq, the subsidiary of the
NASD that functions as an exchange marketplace, is registered as a securities information
processor. Id. It intends to register as a stock exchange in the future. Self-Regulatory
Organizations; National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.; Order Approving
Proposed Rule Change Amending the Nasdaq By-laws and Restated Certificate of
Incorporation, Exchange Act Release No. 42,983, 65 Fed. Reg. 41,116 (June 26, 2000)
[hereinafter Approval of Nasdaq By-Laws]. Pursuant to Rule 3a1-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3al-
1, an organization, association, or group of persons are exempt from the definition of an
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regulated as an "association" under the securities laws. All
broker-dealers registered with the SEC, except those doing business
exclusively on a securities exchange, are required to join the NASD.' 6
Although the efficacy of self-regulation was called into question
by stock market abuses reported in the 1963 SEC Special Study,67
that Study concluded that self-regulation should be maintained and
strengthened.'6 Nevertheless, in 1964 the SEC obtained greater
direct authority over the continuous disclosures made by public
companies. 69 Previously, the SEC was given power to regulate
financial disclosure by issuers making initial public offerings,"0 but
after 1964 the SEC also was given responsibility for regulating annual
and periodic reports.71  Stock exchange listing requirements
maintained their importance as to certain shareholder rights issues,
however, because the SEC does not have the statutory authority to
dictate the corporate governance of listed companies.'71
The Securities Acts Amendments of 1975"7 further strengthened
the SEC's oversight role over the stock exchanges and the NASD by,
among other things, giving the SEC the power to initiate as well as
approve SRO rulemaking,174 expanding the SEC's role in SRO
enforcement and discipline,75 and by allowing the SEC to play an
active role in structuring the market.176  Also, formulation and
enforcement of the net capital rule became a direct SEC
responsibility instead of a regulation of the SROs.' For the first
time, the statute set forth requirements with respect to the
composition of exchange and association boards of directors.78
Additionally, the 1975 Act gave new SROs, such as clearing and
transfer agents and information processors, a statutory foundation. 9
The 1975 Act sought to preserve and reinforce the concept of
industry self-regulation with SEC oversight. However, by directing
"exchange" if it is operated by a national securities association. Therefore, Nasdaq's
registration as an exchange must occur before it can become an independent corporation.
166. Exchange Act § 15(b)(8), 15 U.S.C. § 78(b)(8) (1994). Before 1983, the NASD did
not have this kind of an SRO monopoly. Pub. L. 98-38, § 3, 97 Stat. 206 (1983).
167. SEC, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKET, H.R. Doc. No.
95, 88 Cong., 1' Sess., pt 4, at 502 (1963) [hereinafter Special Study].
168. Id. at 83,414-15.
169. Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467,78 Stat. 565 (1964).
170. Securities Act of 1933 § 5,15 U.S.C. § 77e.
171. Exchange Act 99 12(g), 14(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(g), 78n(a).
172. See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406,407 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
173. Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975).
174. Exchange Act § 19(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (1994).
175. Exchange Act 99 19(c),(d), (g).
176. Exchange Act § 11A.
177. Exchange Act § 15(c)(3).
178. Exchange Act § 6(a)(3), 15A (b)(4).
179. Exchange Act § 17A.
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the SEC to facilitate the creation of a national market system,
injecting competition as a statutory goal and giving the SEC greater
authority over SRO rulemaking, disciplinary activities and other
matters, the SEC became able to exert more leverage over exchange
corporate governance than in the past.
B. Commodities Exchanges
The CTFC has had to address the problems of conflicts of
interest in SRO functions in connection with approving the
demutualization of the CME.'" Prior to 1974 commodity futures
trading was regulated by the Commodity Exchange Authority within
the Department of Agriculture. 8' Then Congress created the CFTC
as an independent agency and gave it exclusive jurisdiction over
future and commodity options trading pursuant to the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974 (Commodity Futures
Act)!" The next year, on October 20, 1975, the CBOT introduced
the first futures contract on a security." Since then, jurisdictional
battles regarding regulation of financial futures have raged between
the SEC and the CFTC.'s These battles have been temporarily
resolved by the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000
(CFMA), permitting the commodities exchanges to trade single stock
futures.'
To a large extent the CFTC is an analogue to the SEC with
respect to the regulation of futures exchanges. The CFTC has
deferred to rulemaking and self-regulation by commodities
exchanges."" Such self-regulation by commodities exchanges has a
long history.'" Initially, the organizational and governing structure of
a commodity exchange was not subject to CFTC regulation."' In
addition to self-regulation by commodities exchanges, the National
Futures Association (NFA) is a free standing self-regulator that was
180. Memorandum from the CFTC, Division of Trading and Markets, Re: The Chicago
Mercantile Exchange's Proposed Demutualization Plan, to the Commission, available at
http://www.cftc.gov./tmlcme__demu._memo.htm (last visited Nov. 14,2000).
181. Jerry W. Markham, The Commodity Exchange Monopoly-Reform Is Needed, 48
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 977, 982 (1991).
182. Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (1974).
183. Dan Glickman & Thomas A. Russo, Look Beyond the "Pits" for Directors, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 28, 1984, at F3.
184. See Markham, supra note 181 at 985-87.
185. Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000).
186. 114 Stat. 1004-05.
187. Stephen Craig Pirrong, The Self-Regulation of Commodities Exchanges: The Case
of Market Manipulation, 38 J.L. & ECON. 141, 142 (1995).
188. THOMAS A. RUSSO, REGULATION OF THE COMMODITIES FUTURES AND
OPTIONS MARKETS § 1.03, at 1-9 (1983).
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granted registration by the CFTC in 1982 as a futures association."
The NFA works with the CFrC to set standards for ethics training of
industry professionals, the review of disclosure documents and issues
concerning statutory disqualification of registered persons and
entities."9 Also, the NFA audits any commodities firms not a member
of any commodities exchange.91
C. Federal Involvement in Exchange Governance
(1) General
Stock and futures exchanges in the United States traditionally
were organized under not-for-profit incorporation laws of a particular
state. Unlike charities or educational institutions, they pay taxes. For
example, the NYSE is incorporated under a New York law that
existed prior to the exchange's incorporation!1 Further, exchanges
have been mutual organizations, owned by their members, and profits
have been returned to members in the form of lower access fees or
other benefits. The members vote for the exchange boards of
directors (sometimes called governors).
Recently, however, electronic exchanges have posed the question
of whether nonmember, for-profit entities may operate as exchanges.
The SEC has determined that a for-profit corporation may register as
a stock exchange." But the Exchange Act limits exchange
membership to registered broker-dealers. 94 The SEC has stated that
it will not grant relief from this requirement to alternative trading
systems (ATSs) wishing to register as exchanges which include
institutions among their members.195 The commodities laws, by
contrast, have been amended to give the CFTC authority to regulate
different types of marketplaces in different ways. 6
189. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SECURITIES ARBITRATION How
INVESTORS FARE, REP. To CONG. REQUESTERS, GAO/GGD-92-74 (May 1992).
190. Dana A. Lukens, Regulation for the Securities Markets?, 10 ANN. REV. BANKING
L. 379,395 n.135 (1991).
191. See Regulation of Investment Companies and Investment Advisers, in THE SEC
SPEAKS IN 1995, at 119 (880 PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. B4-
7080, 1995).
192. N.Y. BUS. CORP. § 402.
193. Adopting ATS Release, supra note 7, at 70,848, 70,883. One big electronic
network, Island ECN Inc., is moving to raise capital and register as a stock exchange.
Rebecca Buckman, Island ECN Raises Capital to Become a Stock Exchange, WALL ST. J.,
May 11, 1999 at C20.
194. Exchange Act § 6(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(c)(1) (1994).
195. Adopting ATS Release, supra note 7, at 70,884-85.
196. As the result of CFMA, the Commodity Exchange Act now provides for two tiers
of markets, or "multilateral transaction execution facilities."
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Floor based exchanges, such as the NYSE and the CBOT have a
limited number of members or seat holders. Traditionally, this gave
the members monopoly powers with respect to the stocks or futures
contracts traded on the exchanges. Concern about the abuse of such
power gave rise to government interest in exchange governance.
Examinations of governance issues have tended to focus on power
struggles between seat holders, professional exchange managers and
upstairs firms. More recently, conflicts have emerged between seat
holders and clearing members. In the view of Congress, exchanges
are affected with a national public interest, requiring their regulation
to insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets.'
1
(2) Stock Exchanges
When the Exchange Act was passed, Congress expressed
concern about the rules of exchanges concerning the classification of
members, method of election of officers and committees, and
disciplining of members. Congress therefore directed the SEC to
study and report on these matters.95 Before the NYSE's governance
could be changed in accordance with SEC recommendations, the
Conway Committee was appointed by the NYSE to study its
reorganization. This committee recommended a more representative
composition of the board, limits on consecutive service and the
creation of a full time paid president and professional staff." A
scandal involving Richard Whitney, a former NYSE president,
interrupted these reforms but did lead to the appointment of the
NYSE's first full time president, William McChesney Martin.2 ° In
1949-50 further governance changes were made in response to
proposals by a group of floor members to try to eliminate self-
perpetuation by a control group. The board was expanded and
consecutive service was limited. 1
In the SEC's 1963 Special Study, exchange governance was again
focused upon. The Study noted that self-perpetuation had not been
eliminated and recommended making the board "more sensitive to
the public character of the exchange and more cognizant of the needs
of public investors"'' by separating voting rights from the concept of
seats, and by giving firms doing business with the public increased
197. See Exchange Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1994).
198. Exchange Act § 19(c), deleted by Securities Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No.
94-29,89 Stat. 97 (1975).
199. SIA WHITE PAPER PT. 4, supra note 162, at 507-08
200. Id.
201. Id. at 571.
202- Id. at 572.
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representation. 3 No changes resulted from these recommendations,
however.
From that time and until 1972, the NYSE Constitution consisted
of thirty-three members, composed of the chairman, the president,
three representatives of the public and twenty-eight members'
representatives. 4  Specialist firms dominated the governance
structure. Of the twenty-nine members' representatives (including
the chairman), seventeen were required to be seat holders and to
spend a substantial part of their time on the floor. Members of the
board could not serve more than two consecutive terms, except after
an interval of two years. Nominations to the board were made by an
elected committee of eight members, five of whom were required to
be seat holders; at least four of whom were required to spend
substantial time on the floor.0 5
Significant changes were made to the NYSE Constitution in 1972
as a result of the Martin Report released in 1971 and its
implementation by the Owens Committee. These changes occurred
in the context of uncertainty about the immunity of stock exchanges
from the antitrust laws, pressures to unfix commission rates 7 and
the financial and operational back office crisis of the securities
industry.0  These developments ultimately led to the enactment of
the 1975 Act that restructured the regulatory relationship between
the SEC and SROs and stripped stock exchanges of some of their
former autonomy.
The Martin Report was intended to compel the NYSE to discard
what vestiges of a private club atmosphere then remained and to
become a quasi-public organization. The principal objectives of a
recommended reorganization were as follows:
1. To give proper recognition in the governing board of the
Exchange to its quasi-public nature and the respective interests of
the public, the companies listed on the Exchange and the members
of the securities industry involved.
2. To provide broad access to the public auction market for all
brokerage firms which meet necessary standards and will be subject
to equal regulation.
3. To create an organization which, through the public
representation on its governing board and the authority and
203. Id. at 576.
204. Id. at 510.
205. Id.
206. HOUSE SUBCOMMIITEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 92D CONG,
1ST SESS., SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) Spec. Rep. 438, at
155-68 (Aug. 25,1972) [hereinafter SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY].
207. Id. at 131-46.
208. Id. at 3-13.
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independence of its management, will strengthen self-regulation
and answer the prevalent criticism that member firms of the New
York Stock Exchange cannot be expected to discipline themselves.
4. To permit and encourage the principal officers and partners
within the member firms to serve on the governing board without
respect to business background, e.g., the floor, the back office or
the New York metropolitan area.
5. To transfer voting power from the individual members to the
member firms and to provide a means for its redistribution so that
each member firm could have voting power more closely related to
its investment and its share of exchange transactions.
6. To change the present seats into shares, without destroying their
market value.2
More specific steps recommended that the NYSE board should
be reduced from thirty-three to twenty-one-ten directors from
member firms, ten from the public and a full time, paid chairman;
public directors should include representatives of listed companies
and all segments of the investing public, including institutional
investors; the ten member firm directors should be principal officers,
partners and proprietors; public directors should have staggered
three-year terms and member firm directors one-year terms; member
firm directors should nominate themselves, but nominations from the
floor should be allowed and cumulative voting would prevail; public
directors should elect their successors; the board should have power
comparable to the board of a business organization, with authority to
amend its constitution and rules, subject to member override; all
directors should be reimbursed for their expenses and public directors
should be compensated for their time and responsibility; existing seats
should be converted into one share, with one vote per share, but ten
shares would be required to enable a firm to place a representative on
the board or be a clearing member and share ownership for voting
purposes limited in proportion to the amount of business done with
the public.2
10
In 1971, the NYSE was incorporated and it adopted a new
constitution. Its new governance structure, which essentially has been
maintained, was adopted in response to the Martin Report, but it did
not adopt all of the Martin Report's recommendations. It fell short of
doing so because votes remained tied to seats; public directors were
nominated by a joint-industry-public committee and there was no
requirement that the board include representatives of all segments of
the investing public; continuous service was not limited; and the
board was not given the power to amend the constitution.211 When
209. Id. at 103.
210. Id. at 103-05.
211. Id. at 105-06.
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the NYSE was incorporated in 1971, the SEC expressed some doubts
as to whether this step would impair the effectiveness of the exchange
as a self-regulator.2 2 In 1972, the House Subcommittee on Commerce
and Finance recommended that the NYSE and the American Stock
Exchange (Amex) and the NASD reorganize their boards in
conformity with the principles laid down in the Martin Report.
213
By the time the 1975 Act was passed Congress was not inclined
to put rigorous corporate governance standards into the Exchange
Act. In part, this was not necessary because the term "member" of an
exchange was defined in such a way as to divorce it from the concept
of a "seat 214 and the SEC was given plenary control over specialists'
211activities.   In addition, the SEC was given the power to abrogate,
amend or add to the rules of any SRO. 216 Although self-regulation
was preserved, and in some ways strengthened, a new emphasis on
competition, investor protection and fair procedures changed the
manner in which exchanges and associations could operate. Access to
the market was opened up217 and standards were put in place for the
design of exchange and NASD rules and disciplinary proceedings.2 8
With specific reference to exchange boards of directors, the
Exchange Act was amended in 1975 to provide that the rules of an
exchange must "assure a fair representation of its members in the
selection of its directors and administration of its affairs and provide
that one or more directors shall be representative of issuers and
investors and not be associated with a member of the exchange,
broker, or dealer.""2 9 A corresponding provision was inserted for
associations."0 The House bill had required that exchanges and
associations include public representatives and further required that
these SROs appropriate sums for use of public directors to employ
staff independent of the exchange or association, but such provisions
were dropped in the conference committee. 1
212. See SEC Comments on NYSE Incorporation, Exchange Act Release No. 9112,
1971 VL 1717 (SEC) (Mar. 17, 1971).
213. SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY, supra note 206, at 107.
214. Exchange Act §§ 3(a)(3), 3(a)(9), 3(a)(19), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(3), (a)(9), (a)(19)
(1994).
215. Exchange Act § 11(b). Previously exempt specialists, floor traders and floor
brokers were required to register with the SEC.
216. Exchange Act § 19(c).
217. Exchange Act §§ 11A(b)(5)(A), 19(f).
218. Exchange Act §§ 6(b)(7), 15A(b)(8), 19(b).
219. Exchange Act, § 6(a)(3).
220. Exchange Act § 15A(b)(4) (1994).
221. REPORT OF THE SENATE-HOUSE CONFERENCE COMMITTEE, H.R. CONF. REPT.
No. 94-229 (1975).
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(3) Futures Exchanges
Scrutiny of and debates concerning the governance of futures
exchanges occurred in connection with amendments to the
Commodity Futures Act.' Because the Commodity Futures Act
gives commodity exchanges a monopoly over the trading of futures,
the perception of conflicts of interest on the part of exchanges was
examined in the early 1990s. Commodity exchanges were
traditionally governed by their floor members, consisting of "locals"
and "independent" floor brokers, who used their leverage to control
exchange appointments and policy.2"
Futures exchanges have had no ban on institutional membership.
Banks and large agricultural interests traditionally have owned
memberships. Because of the enforced monopoly futures exchanges
have on the trading of particular contracts, the fear of
disintermediation that led to the ban on stock exchange institutional
membership in the 1975 Act was not relevant to futures exchanges.
The public had only token representation on futures exchanges
in the form of outside public directors."4 Candidates for the board
generally were selected by their predecessors.2 Floor members could
select their own candidates by petition and could circulate petitions
on the floor demanding that proposals be adopted by the exchange
boards2 6 Although exchanges had professional staffs, they were
governed by exchange committees composed of exchange members. '
The House of Representatives approved a bill in 1989 that would
have required at least twenty percent of the members of the board of
a futures exchange to be public representatives with no exchange
affiliations, but this proposed law failed to pass.m
In 1989 there were undercover FBI sting operations at the CME
and CBOT that resulted in the indictment of forty-eight individuals
for various trading practice violations on commodity exchange
floors. 9 These criminal indictments were upheld, although the trials
had mixed results.' In response to the sting operation Congress
passed legislation to strengthen regulation of the trading pits. Among
other things, audit trails were strengthened, there was increased
regulation of floor broker associations, and more outsiders were
222. Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (1974).
223. Markham, supra note 181, at 1009.
224. Id. at 1010.
225. Id. at 1009.
226. Id. at 1011.
227. Id.
228. H.R. REP. No. 101-236, at 6 (1989); see also Markham, supra note 181, at 1013.
229. JERRY W. MARKHAM, COMMODITIES REGULATION: FRAUD, MANIPULATION
AND OTHER CLAIMS § 14.10 (1998).
230. Id.
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required to be included on exchange boards and disciplinary
committees23 '
These 1992 amendments to the Commodity Futures Act to
require diversity of membership on exchange boards and disciplinary
committees required exchange boards to:
(A) provide for meaningful representation.., of a diversity of
interests, including-
(i) futures commission merchants;
(ii) producers of, and consumers, processors, distributors, or
merchandisers of, principal commodities traded on the board
of trade;
(iii) floor brokers and traders; and
(iv) participants in a variety of pits or principal groups of
commodities traded on the exchange.
(B) provide that no less than 20 percent of the regular voting
members of such board be comprised of nonmembers of such
contract market's board of trade with -
(i) expertise in futures trading, or the regulation thereof, or in
commodities traded through contracts on the board of trade;
or
(ii) other eminent qualifications making such person capable
of participating in and contributing to board deliberations.
(C) provide that no less than 10 percent of the regular voting
members of such board be comprised where applicable of farmers,
producers, merchants, or exporters of principal commodities traded
on the exchange;
Furthermore, such exchanges were required to provide on all
major disciplinary committees a diversity of membership sufficient to
ensure fairness and to prevent special treatment or preference for any
person in the conduct of disciplinary proceedings and the assessment
of penalties.3
V. Current Governance Structures and the Future of
Self-Regulation
A. Stock Exchanges
The NYSE has gone considerably beyond the requirements of
the Exchange Act. Half its board is composed of public directors not
associated with the securities industry, while the half that is so
231. Idt
232. 7 U.S.C. § 7a(14) (1994), added by Pub. L. 102-546, title II, § 206(a)(1), 106 Stat.
3590,3601 (1992).
233. Commodity Futures Act § 7a(15).
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associated is a constituency board. There are requirements for
industry directors from firms that have substantial direct contact with
securities customers, for specialist members and nonspecialist floor
members and geographical specifications.' The NYSE has 1,366
members who have physical access to the trading floor and who are
the owners of the exchange3 5 However, the NYSE also has up to
twenty-four physical access members, electronic access members and
lessee members.36 The lessee members are a significant factor in
governance issues because they can contract for the right to vote.2
Moreover, at the end of 1999, 863 of the NYSE's 1,366 regular seats
were leased.3"
The NYSE Chairman has explained that the diversity of interest
among NYSE members is a continuous source of tension and conflict.
Members are only able to realize economic value from their right to
trade on the NYSE floor, but member firms compete with one
another in a variety of businesses, including OTC market making in
listed securities. Demutualization offers greater commonality among
equity owners and avoids concentration of ownership power in a
particular group of exchange participants. Also, a demutualized
exchange can raise capital for strategic affiliations, technological
improvements or new systems.3 9 Nevertheless, the NYSE has yet to
move forward with a demutualization plan.
The NASD does not have "seats" since it has never had a floor.
Rather, its membership is composed of broker-dealers. The NASD's
job of self-regulation has always been difficult because its
membership is nationwide, large and diverse and not pre-selected.
24
Further, its emphasis in the past was on members regulating and
disciplining themselves, as distinguished from regulation by a hired
staff, and in promoting voluntary compliance with ethical standards.41
234. See NYSE CONST., art. IV, § 2(a)-(b), 2 N. Y. S. E. GUIDE (CCH), at 1151.
235. See id., art. II, § 1(a), at 1051.
236. See id., §§ 1(b)-(c), 2.
237. Id. Electronic access members (who have access to the DOT system) initially had
the vote, but new electronic access members after 1986 do not vote. See Order
Approving Proposed Rule Change, Exchange Act Release No. 22,959, 51 Fed. Reg. 8060,
8063 (Mar. 7, 1986).
238. See Richard A. Grasso, CEO, NYSE, Public Ownership of the U.S. Stock Markets,
Testimony before the Sen. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (Sept. 28,
1999), at 10 [hereinafter Grasso Testimony]. In addition to voting for members of the
board of directors of the NYSE and its chairman, regular members are entitled to one vote
on "any sale, lease or exchange or other disposition of all, or substantially all of the assets
of the exchange; any merger or consolidation in which the exchange is a constituent
corporation; or any dissolution or final liquidation of the Exchange." See NYSE Const.,
art. 3, § 9(a), 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH), at 1109.
239. Grasso Testimony, supra note 228.
240. See SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 138, at 83,416.
241. Id. at 83,414.
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Principles emanating from the Maloney Act and guiding the NASD
were democratic organization, business person's judgment and local
autonomy.
242
The NASD was completely reorganized in 1996 in the aftermath
of a Department of Justice and SEC investigation into
anticompetitive practices by OTC market makers.243 The SEC
criticized the NASD for its regulatory deficiencies in failing to
uncover these practices or discipline its members, and found that the
NASD was unduly influenced by Nasdaq market making firms with
respect to rulemaking, the disciplinary process and the admission of
new members.2" In a settlement of these matters, the NASD agreed,
among other things, to achieve greater diversity of representation on
its board and its policy making committees, to provide for the
autonomy and independence of its staff with respect to disciplinary
and regulatory matters, to create an enhanced audit trail, and to
improve its surveillance and examination of order handling and the
reliability of trade reporting."
The 1996 NASD reorganization resulted in the creation of a
parent holding company and two operating subsidiaries-Nasdaq and
NASD Regulation, Inc. (NASDR). Thereafter, NASD purchased the
American Stock Exchange, Inc. (Amex), which operated as a
subsidiary. All four boards are constituency boards that are required
to have a majority of nonindustry members. 4 6 NASD governance is
again in a state of flux because of a restructuring that will result in the
sale of seventy-eight percent of Nasdaq to issuers and NASD
members and lead to the registration of Nasdaq as a stock exchange
with the SEC.
247
On April 14, 2000 the membership of the NASD voted
overwhelmingly to turn Nasdaq into a for-profit company and alter its
ownership structure.2 s  This ongoing transformation is being
accomplished in two stages. In the first stage, up to forty-nine percent
of Nasdaq's common stock was offered in a private placement to
NASD members, Nasdaq issuers, institutional investors, and strategic
partners. After a further sale of Nasdaq stock in the second phase,
242. Grasso Testimony, supra note 228.
243. See In the Matter of Nat'l Ass'n of Securities Dealers, Exchange Act Release No.
37,542 (Aug. 8,1996), 1996 WL 452691, at *1.
244. See id. at '2.
245. See id at *2-3.
246. See By-Laws of the NASD, art. VII, § 4(a), Nasdaq By-Laws, art. IV, § 4.1,
NASDR By-Laws, art. IV, §§ 4.2,4.3, NASD GUIDE (CCH), 1315, 1503,1703-3.
247. See NASDAQ, FACr SHEET ON THE PROPOSED NASD RESTRUCTURING,
available at http:/lwww.nasdaqnews.com/newslpr20001fact3l3.html. See supra note 165.
248. See Nasdaq Firms Solidly Favor Sale of Market, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15,2000, at C3.
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the NASD vill own only a minority stake of approximately twenty-
two percent of Nasdaq.2 " A future public offering is contemplated.
In connection with the first phase of the restructuring, the NASD
separated Amex from The Nasdaq-Amex Market Group, a holding
company that was a wholly-owned subsidiary of the NASD, and the
Group was then merged with and into Nasdaq. Nasdaq then effected
a 49,999-for-one stock dividend creating 100 million shares of
Common Stock outstanding (all of which were initially owned by the
NASD), and authorized the issuance of an additional 30.9 million in
new shares of Common Stock to be offered for sale by Nasdaq as part
of the Restructuring." ° On June 28, 2000, Nasdaq sold an aggregate
of 23,663,746 shares of common stock for an aggregate consideration
of $260,301,206. The NASD sold an aggregate of 6,415,049 Warrants
to purchase an aggregate amount of 25,660,196 shares of common
stock and an aggregate of 323,196 shares of Common Stock owned by
the NASD for an aggregate consideration of $74,120,695.2"
In the second phase of the restructuring, on January 18, 2001,
Nasdaq sold an aggregate of 5,028,797 shares of Common Stock for
an aggregate consideration of $65,374,361. The NASD sold an
aggregate of 4,392,345 Warrants to purchase an aggregate amount of
17,569,380 shares of Common Stock and an aggregate of 4,222,295
shares of Common Stock owned by the NASD for an aggregate
consideration of $116,382,665.f2 Investors in both phases of this
restructuring consisted of NASD members, Nasdaq market
participants, issuers with securities quoted on Nasdaq, and other
strategic partners.
On May 3, 2001, Nasdaq issued and sold $240,000,000 in
aggregate principal amount of its four percent convertible
subordinated debentures due 2006 to Hellman & Friedman Capital
Partners IV, L.P. and certain of its affiliated limited partnerships
(collectively, "Hellman & Friedman"). The subordinated debentures
are convertible at any time into an aggregate of 12,000,000 shares of
Common Stock, subject to adjustment. Hellman & Friedman owns
approximately 9.8% of Nasdaq on an as-converted basis. In
249. See Press Release, NASD, NASD Restructuring Wins in Landslide Vote of the
Members (Apr. 14, 2000), available at http://www.nasdaqnews.com/news/pr2000/
ne._section00_091.html; see also Terzah Ewing, NASD Members Vote to Sell Nasdaq,
Paving the Way for Private Ownership, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 2000, at C21. The NASD
will continue to control Nasdaq until Nasdaq's registration as a stock exchange becomes
effective.
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connection with the transaction, Nasdaq has agreed to use its best
efforts to seek stockholder approval of a charter amendment that
would provide for voting debt in order to permit Hellman &
Friedman to vote on an as-converted basis on all matters on which
common stockholders have the right to vote, subject to a five percent
voting limitation in Nasdaq's Restated Certificate of IncorporationY
In May 2001, Warren Hellman of Hellman & Friedman went on the
Nasdaq board.*'
On May 3, 2001, Nasdaq used the net proceeds from the sale of
the subordinated debentures to purchase 18,461,538 shares of
Common Stock from the NASD for $13 per share for an aggregate
purchase price of $239,999,994. These repurchased shares have been
cancelled and are no longer outstanding. As of May 4, 2001, NASD
owns thirty-one percent of Nasdaq assuming all warrants are fully
exercised.
Among the purposes of the demutualization of Nasdaq are to
permit the NASD to focus more intently on its original mission of
being a membership-focused organization; to streamline corporate
governance; and to create a financially stronger Nasdaq better able to
address competitive challenges and invest in new technology. 5 The
Nasdaq board will be restructured prior to its registration as an
exchange. Currently, all ten members of the Nasdaq board sit on the
NASD board. It is contemplated that the Nasdaq board will be
increased by four members who will not serve on the NASD board,




The CBOT was established in 1848 and is the world's oldest
derivatives exchange.' 7 It was the world's largest futures exchange,
until its volume was eclipsed by Eurex in 19 9 9.'s At its inception, the
CBOT traded only agricultural futures contracts, but in 1975 it
expanded to include financial futures, including the U.S. Treasury
253. Id.
254. Nasdaq Expands Board-Positioning For Its Anticipated IPO and Nasdaq's Global
Expansion, PR Newswire, May 2,2001.
255. See Ewing, supra note 249.
256. See id.
257. ABOUT CBOT, CBOT TODAY, ORGANIZATIONAL PROFILE, available at http:
//www.cbot.comlcbotwwv/page0,1398,10+10+83,00.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2000)
[hereinafter ORGANIZATIONAL PROFILE].
258. See Silvia Ascarelli & Peter A. McKay, CBOT Directors Agree to a Eurex
Partnership, WALL ST. J., May 19, 1999, at C21.
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Bond futures contract and in 1997 it launched futures and futures-
options contracts based on the Dow Jones Industrial Average. 29 For
decades, the primary method of trading at the CBOT was open outcry
where traders meet face to face in trading pits.26 In 1994, the CBOT
launched an electronic trading system called Project A, and in August
2000 replaced Project A with a/c/e electronic trading platform
(alliance/CBOT/Eurex).261
The CBOT is a membership Association which has over 3,600
individual members.262 The eighteen director Board includes nine
elected directors who are full members of the CBOT, of whom two
are nonresidents of the Chicago area; four nonmember directors
nominated by the President and approved by the Board; and two
associate members.263 However, under a new for-profit structure, the
board will be reduced to nine members, two of whom will be
independent.26
In recent years there have been some severe governance
upheavals at the CBOT as a reaction to competition and
technological changes. The precipitating cause of these upheavals is
competition to the CBOT's floor based, open outcry trading system
coming from electronic exchanges, including new trading systems
designed by CBOT's members. In 1998 there were merger talks
between the CBOT and the CME, but the CBOT pulled out.265 Then
in early 1998, Eurex, the all-electronic German/Swiss derivatives
exchange, began talks with the CBOT regarding a joint venture
creating a single global electronic trading system to replace Project A
(the CBOT's then interactive computerized trading system). Two
years later, CBOT members voted to discontinue the proposed
alliance only to reconsider it six months later. Finally, on August 28,
2000, the CBOT Eurex Alliance was launched.267  The alliance
259. ORGANIZATIONAL PROFILE, supra note 257.
260. Id
261. Id.
262. Of these, 1,402 are full members. There also are associate members, which have
fractional membership participations. See Amendment No. 4, Form S-4 CBOT
Registration Statement, available at http:llwww.sec.govlArchivesledgar/data/117463/
00009501310501062/0000950131-01-501062.txt, at 124 [hereinafter CBOT S-4].
263. Id. at 97.
264. Id.
265. See Terzah Ewing, Idea of Merging CBOT, CME Gains Support, WALL ST. J., July
13, 1998, at Cl; Jim Kharouf, Merger Talks For Real This Time?, FUTURES (Oster), Sept.
1, 1998; Board of CBOT Calls Off CME Back-Office Alliance, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 1998,
at C20.
266. ABOUT CBOT ANNUAL REPORT THE 1999 ANNUAL MESSAGE FROM THE
CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE CHAIRMAN AND PRESIDENT, available at
http://www.cbot.com/annual/main.html [hereinafter 1999 ANNUAL MESSAGE].
267. CBOT Eurex Successfully Launch a/c/e-alliancecboteurex, Aug. 28, 2000,
available at http://www.cbot.com/cbot/www/contdetail/0,1493,11+24+10S+863,000.html.
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provides investors with the "opportunity to trade the most active
futures and options products in the world from a single screen."'2
While the exchanges share technology and operating costs, the CBOT
and Eurex will remain completely separate entities and each will
receive all profits generated by its products.269 In connection with the
close vote on the initial rejection of a joint venture between the
CBOT and Eurex (450 to 390), 270 there was a contested election for
the CBOT chairmanship. David Brennan ("Brennan"), a soybean
trader who wanted to retain open outcry trading in the pits won this
election 71  Then, there was an effort by Brennan to oust the
President, Thomas Donovan ("Donovan"), a career employee, which
was not immediately successful, but Donovan retired thereafter. 2 At
the end of 2000, Brennan lost the CBOT chairmanship in another
contested election (in a vote of 557-5/6 to 550) to Nikolas J.
Neubauer.2' Thereafter, David J. Vitale, a long time Chicago bank
executive, was appointed President and CEO.274
Competitive threats from Eurex and other electronic futures
exchanges led to proposals for restructuring the CBOT with a view
toward its demutualization. According to the CBOT, "institutional
investors are demanding greater liquidity, lower cost and more
efficient trade execution, enhanced access and a sophisticated
supporting infrastructure."2" Further, new electronic markets are
delivering such services in a more nimble and focused way than
traditional open outcry exchanges? 6 Therefore, a restructuring of the
CBOT to transform it into a demutualized publicly traded company is
ongoing.
The restructuring initiatives are designed to accomplish several
objectives. First, the CBOT will be demutualized by converting it
268. 1999 ANNUAL MESSAGE, supra note 266.
269. Id
270. CBOT/Eurex Vote 2: Represents Break With Old Regime, Dow JONES INT'L
NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 27, 1999. See Silvia Ascarelli, German Exchange Still Seeks Entry
Into U.S. Market, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 1999, at B2; Michael Dabaie, CBOT Eyes Links
After Spurning Eurex, SEC INDUSTRY NEWS, Feb. 1, 1999, Vol. 11, No. 5, at 1.
271. See Nikki Tait, Ouster of CBOT Chief Leaves Cloud over Reform Efforts, FIN.
TIMES, Dec. 11, 1998.
272. See Greg Bums, Talk of Move to Oust Donovan Rocks the CBOT, CHI. TRIB.,
Apr. 15, 1999, at 1; Peter A. McKay, Donovan Resigns as CBOT President and CEO,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 17,2000, at C19.
273. Nickolas J. Neubauer Elected Chairman of the CBOT, available at
http:lwww.bpt.com/cbot/wwvw/contdetail0,1493,11+24+108_1811,OO.html (last visited
June 15,2001).
274. CBOT Announces Appointment of David Vitale as President and CEO, Feb. 20,
2000, available at http:llwww.cbot.comlcbotlwww/contdetaill0,1493,11+24+108+
2410,00.html (last visited June 15, 2001).
275. CBOT S-4, supra note 262, at 37.
276. Id
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from a nonstock, not-for-profit corporation into a stock, for-profit
corporation and distributing shares of common stock of the for-profit
CBOT to the current CBOT members. Second, the CBOT's
corporate governance structure will be modernized by substantially
eliminating the membership petition process, streamlining the Board
of Directors and making certain other changes to improve the
efficiency of the CBOT's corporate decision-making process while
creating certain "core rights" including a member fee preference and
trading pit preservation measures which cannot be altered without
member approval. Finally, the CBOT's electronic trading business
will be reorganized and consolidated.2"
Following a period of review, it is expected that the SEC will
declare the CBOT's Registration Statement effective and the CBOT
will submit the restructuring transactions detailed therein to a
member vote. Once the approval of the membership has been
obtained and other conditions have been satisfied, the CBOT will
convert to a for-profit corporation and shares of stock in that
corporation will be distributed to CBOT members. Shortly
thereafter, the Board of Directors of the CBOT will be reduced from
eighteen members to nine members as the result of a shareholder
election. In mid-2000, the CBOT reincorporated in Delaware in
order to enhance its corporate flexibility, with a view toward pursuing
its restructuring initiative.278
(2) CME
The CME is an outgrowth of the Chicago Produce Exchange
which was established in 1874 to provide an organized market for
butter, eggs, poultry and other farm products. 9 In 1898 a division of
the Produce Exchange formed The Chicago Butter and Egg Board,
and in 1919 the name of this Board was changed to the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange.' In 1969 the Chicago Mercantile Exchange
Trust was established to provide discretionary financial assistance to
customers of any clearing firm which should become insolvent.8 ' In
1972 the International Monetary Market (IMM) was created vith the
trading of seven foreign currencies.' This trading followed the
demise of the Bretton Woods Agreement fixing international
277. Letter from Nikolas Neubauer, CBOT, to CBOT Members, available at
http:ilwww.cbot.comlcbotlwww/contdetail 0,1493,11+24+108+2175,00.html (last visited
June 15,2001).
278. Id.
279. CH. MERCANTILE EXCHANGE, HISTORY OF INNOVATION, available at





exchange rates, and transformed the CME into the first major futures
exchange to apply to financial instruments the principles of futures
markets.' A decade later, in 1981, cash settlement of futures
contracts, instead of physical delivery, was inaugurated.' In 1982 the
Index and Option Market (IOM) division was formed for the purpose
of listing index and options contracts.' The first contract traded on
the IOM was the Standard & Poor's 500 (S&P 500) futures contract.1
6
In 1984, the CMB and Singapore Monetary Exchange (SIMEX)
instituted their mutual offset system, the first international linkage
between exchanges.' In 1987, in conjunction with Reuters Holdings
PLC, the CME pioneered GLOBEX, the first worldwide after hours
electronic trading system?2 In 1995, the CME launched the Growth
and Emerging Markets (GEM) division to provide access to
investment in emerging market countries.m In 1998, the CME
launched GLOBEX2 based on a technology swap with the Paris
Bourse and MATIF.
Until its recent demutualization, the CME was an Illinois
Corporation, incorporated as a not-for-profit comgany, and owned by
its members who had purchased exchange seats. There were four
categories of memberships: full CME seats; IM seats; IOM seats
and GEM seats. Board membership was required by the CME's
Rules to be composed of twelve CME members elected by CME
members; eight IMM members elected by IMM members; four IOM
members elected by IOM members and up to ten persons appointed
by the Chairman and approved by the Board.291
Further, the CME Board was required to have a meaningful
diversity of interests, including: floor brokers; floor traders; futures
commission merchants; producers, consumers, processors,
distributors, and merchandisers of commodities traded on the CME;
participants in a variety of pits or principal groups of commodities
traded on the CME; and other market users or participants. To the
extent that no elected director represented one of the interests listed
283. CHI. MERCANTILE EXCH., ABOUT THE EXCHANGE, BACKGROUND ON CME, ITS
MEMBERSHIP AND ITS PRODUCTS, available at http:llwww.cme.comlexchangel







290. Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation of the CME under the Illinois
General-Not-For-Profit Corporation Act of 1986, 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/101-01
(West 1996).
291. CME Rule 210. See also CHI. MERCANTILE EXCH. CME RULEBOOK (2001),
available at http://www.cmerulebook.com (last visited Oct. 26, 2001).
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above, a person representing such interest was required to be
appointed to the Board. At least ten percent of the regular voting
members of the Board were required to be comprised, where
applicable, of persons representing farmers, producers, merchants or
exporters of principal commodities underlying contracts traded on the
CME. In addition, at least twenty percent of the regular voting
members of the Board were required to be comprised of persons who
were not members of the CME, currently salaried employees of the
CME, primarily performing services for the CME in a capacity other
than a member of the Board, or officers, principals or employees of a
firm which holds a membership at the CME either in its own name or
through an employee on behalf of the firm.2
On November 13, 2000 the CME became the first U.S. futures
exchanges to demutualize, in a restructuring designed to streamline
its decision-making processes and change its financial model by
converting memberships into shares with trading rights in CME
products, as well as into shares representing pure equity.' CME
converted itself into a publicly held, for-profit corporation in several
steps. The original Illinois not-for-profit corporation initially was
merged into a new Delaware nonstock corporation and immediately
thereafter into a stockholder-owned, for-profit Delaware corporation.
In a final step, CME then issued Class A and Class B shares. Both
classes of stock have the traditional features of common stock;
however, the primary purpose of the Class B stock is to confer trading
privileges associated with exchange membership. The transaction did
not represent an initial public offering (IPO).
As a result of the demutualization, 25,855,200 shares of Class A
common stock were allocated on a 3-2-1 basis to members of the
CME, International Monetary Market (IMM) and Index and Option
Market (IOM) divisions. In addition, 4,722 shares of Class B
common stock were issued to exchange members in series
corresponding to the former membership divisions. Each CME
member received a B-1 share, each IMM member received a B-2
share, each IOM member received a B-3 share, each member of the
Growth and Emerging Market (GEM) division received a B-4 share,
and those holding a fractional interest in a GEM seat received a B-5
share. Each B series share confers the trading privileges associated
with the membership interests that are converted into that series,
along with the traditional features of common stock.
292. Id.
293. Press Release, CME, CME Becomes a For-Profit Corporation, Nov. 13, 2000,
available at http://www.cme.com/shownews.cfm?Newsltem=002AB00-EA20_IA54_
B30D80C59A2800 (visited Nov. 20, 2000).
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Class B shares are traded much the way memberships or "seats"
on the exchange were traditionally bought and sold. CME's
Membership Department posts bids and offers. The value of Class B
shares, as determined by the market, are based on the value of the
trading right and of the A share equivalents bundled with the trading
right. Class A shares are subject to trading restrictions which will be
lifted gradually over a period of fifteen months after the
demutualization transaction. For example, after six months,
shareholders can trade twenty-five percent of their initially allocated
Class A shares. For the first six months following demutualization,
Class A shares can be sold only in conjunction with a sale of the
related Class B share. Such sales will occur through a process
substantially the same as the process for selling existing membership
interests (i.e., through the Membership Department). After six
months, increasing portions of the Class A shares can be transferred
independently of the associated Class B shares.9
The CME demutualization proceeded with over ninety-eight
percent of the membership in favor under the direction of a new
CEO, hired by the board rather than chosen by the members. It
accomplished the transformation of the CME into a for-profit
corporation headed in the direction of becoming a public company.
In accordance with the restructuring, the existing thirty-nine-member
board of directors will be reduced to nineteen members over a two-
year phased reduction period. Following the 2002 election, the Board
will be composed of nineteen directors: thirteen directors known as
"equity directors" and six directors known as "Class B directors".
The thirteen equity directors (consisting of one nonmember and six
members or nonmembers, all serving two year terms) will be elected
by the Class A and Class B shareholders from a slate proposed by the
Board Nominating Committee. The six divisional directors (three
CME, two IMM, and one IOM) will be voted by the Class B
divisional shareholders from a slate proposed by the Divisional
Nominating Committees.295 Class B shareholders will have rights to
change certain "core rights," rights associated with trading privileges
conferred by those shares, while Class A will not have this right.
Therefore, although Class B shareholders will represent only
294. See QUESTIONS & ANSWERS ON THE DEMUTUALIZATION OF THE CHICAGO
MERCANTILE EXCHANGE INTO CHICAGO MERCANTILE EXCHANGE INC., available at
http://www.cme.com/exchange/demutualizequestions.html.
295. Memorandum from Ann M. Cresce, Corporate Secretary, CME, to All CME
Members (Oct. 10, 2000), available at http://www.cme.com/allaire/spectra/systen
securemediastore/20001010ELECTION.pdf. The GEM division will not elect any Class B
director. Finally, after the 2002 election, there will be no "appointed directors."
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approximately ten percent of the overall equity interest, such voting:
rights offer Class B shareholders some ability to block changes.96
The CME has thus been transformed from a membership mutual
organization into a for-profit business corporation. Yet, it continues
to act as an SRO for its members and markets and, at this time, does
not plan to out source its regulatory responsibilities.
C. Models for Self-Regulation
(1) Conflicts of Interest
One of the more contentious questions under discussion
concerning exchange demutualization is the future of self-regulation.
The issue is whether a commercial entity carrying on the business of
running an exchange and seeking to protect and promote its business
can continue to support the integrity and efficiency of the trading
markets by setting and enforcing appropriate regulations in the public
interest.2 97 It can be argued that there would be conflicts of interests
between shareholders and members in a demutualized exchange
environment that would diminish the ability of exchanges to engage
in effective self-regulation. A potentially serious conflict is the
regulation of an ATS market by the NYSE or NASD. These conflicts
could become manifest in discrimination through sanctions imposed
in disciplinary proceedings, unfairness in not being permitted to
participate in particular activities or discrimination with respect to
fees charged.29' This is perhaps a more serious problem at the NASD
than the NYSE because all broker-dealers are compelled to join the
NASD. Further, securities firms are concerned about the costs of
multiple SROs, especially if several ATSs become exchanges and
begin to engage in self-regulation. Therefore, some industry
members argue in favor of a single SRO for exchanges and member
firms.
The NYSE and NASD engage in self-regulation in four areas:
listed company governance and disclosure; surveillance and discipline
of their markets and specialists, floor brokers and market makers;
member firm financial and operational compliance; and fair and
equitable treatment of customers. Commodities exchanges are not
296. Annual Meeting and Board Election Set for April 18, 2001, CFTC, Memorandum
from the Division of Trading and Markets Re: The Chicago Mercantile Exchange's
Proposed Demutualization Plan, to the Commission, available at
http://wwv.cftc.gov./tmltmce-demutualization-memo.html (visited Nov. 14,2000).
297. See INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'NS TECHNICAL COMM., DISCUSSION PAPER ON
STOCK EXCHANGE DEMUTUALIZATION 3-4 (Dec. 2000), available at
http://www.iosco.orgldocs-public-2000/2000-stockexchange_demutualization.html
[hereinafter IOSCO DISCUSSION PAPER].
298. Id. at 19.
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engaged in issuer corporate governance regulation, but they regulate
their markets and members. Also, both the NYSE and NASD run
arbitration facilities for disputes between members and disputes
between members and customers, but customer reparations
proceedings against commodities intermediaries can be prosecuted
before the CFTC.
The NASD membership has always been more diverse than the
NYSE and is not pre-selected. Further, it has a nationwide
organization with some local autonomy. At the NYSE's New York
location, more exclusive membership and domination by the
industry's largest firms has given its inspection and regulatory
operations a different cast than that of the NASD. Further, in a
financial crisis, the NYSE's ties to the New York Federal Reserve
Bank have been important.2 9
NYSE listing requirements go back to the nineteenth century
and stem from a concern about the quality of the securities sold on
the exchange. These requirements were intended to facilitate an
efficient, continuous auction market by setting minimum numerical
standards for capitalization, number of shares and shareholders, by
establishing disclosure requirements and by specifying certain
shareholder protection or corporate governance mechanisms.' The
NYSE developed these requirements because it recognized that
standards were good for its business and could give the exchange a
competitive advantage.31  When Nasdaq was organized as an
electronic market, it also established listing qualifications in order to
preserve and improve the quality of and public confidence in its
market.
If the NYSE and Nasdaq become public companies it will
perhaps be anomalous for them to negotiate listing agreements with
themselves and then supervise continuing compliance with such
agreements. For this reason, when the Stockholm and Australian
Stock Exchanges went public, government regulators were assigned
the task of overseeing exchange disclosure to shareholders. 3 On the
other hand, the NYSE and Nasdaq will continue to have a motivation
to market their exchanges as lists of quality issuers. At least one
commentator has argued that the benefits of increased capital
mobility would be better realized through regulatory decentralization
299. See TIM METZ, BLACK MONDAY 160-61,195,212-14,234 (1988).
300. See Douglas C. Michael, Untenable Status of Corporate Governance Listing
Standards Under the Securities Exchange Act, 47 Bus. LAW 1461, 1465 (1992).
301. Id
302 See NASD RULES 4300,4310, NASD MANUAL (CCH) at 5271-79.
303. See Roberta S. Karmel, Stock Exchange Demutualization in Sweden and Australia,
N.Y.L.J., Aug. 19, 1999, at 3. In the United States, however, the SEC already has this
authority.
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than greater centralization. Under a decentralized model, exchanges
should be the primary writers and enforcers of rules relating to
disclosure by listed companies, standards of conduct for member
broker-dealers and for market structure.3
When an exchange becomes a for-profit public company there
are some new conflicts that could call into question its regulatory role
with regard to issuer corporate governance. If an exchange enters or
considering entering into a joint venture with a listed company, it
might be tempted to under regulate that company. Conversely, an
exchange could behave in a discriminatory way toward a competitor.
For example, Instinet, a direct competitor of the NYSE and
NASDAQ is now a public issuer. 5 It may well wonder if it will be
treated on an equal footing with other listed companies.
Many corporate governance listing standard questions arise in
the context of contests for corporate control. Demutualized
exchanges tend to have corporate governance provisions to prevent
any shareholder from having more than a specified percentage stock
ownership, thus insulating them from being taken over."6 Would such
an issuer continue vigorously to enforce corporate governance
standards preventing companies from adopting certain poison pills in
response to a hostile takeover bid without shareholder approval?"
Broker-dealer regulation by exchanges has its roots in efforts to
assure the credit worthiness of exchange members. This continues to
304. See Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REv. 1453, 1454
(1997). The author has examined this aspect of exchange demutualization at greater
length in Roberta S. Karmel, The Future of Corporate Governance Listing Requirements,
54 SMU L. REV. 325 (2001).
305. On May 9, 2001 Instinet, a Delaware limited liability company, converted into a
Delaware corporation, Instinet Group Incorporated. Shortly thereafter, on May 18, 2001,
Instinet Group Incorporated announced that its shares commenced trading on the Nasdaq
stock market under the symbol "INET" after its registration statement relating to the
initial public offering of 32,000,000 newly issued shares of common stock was declared
effective by the SEC. The underwriters have an option to purchase an additional
4,800,000 shares to cover over-allotments. Instinet used approximately $150 million of the
IPO proceeds to repay its indebtedness to Reuters Group PLC ("Reuters") for an
advance used in May 2001 to fund a simultaneous return of capital to Reuters. Following
completion of the IPO, Reuters will hold 86.6% of Instinet's share capital (approximately
eighty-five percent if the underwriters exercise their over-allotment option). INSTINET
GROUP INC, 2001 PROSPECrUS (May 18, 2001), available at
http://www.investor.instinet.comledgar.cfm.
306. Nasdaq has a five percent voting limit in its certificate of incorporation. See supra
note 253. The CME now has limits on shareholder transfers. See supra note 294. The
purpose of such limits are, in part, to prevent an exchange from falling into the wrong
hands. Because exchange members were licensed prior to demutualization, there are not
statutory restrictions limiting controlling persons of exchanges to persons meeting
regulatory approval standards, but this is a likely future probability.
307. See NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, §§ 308, 312.03 (1999), available at
http://www.nyse.com/listed/listed.html.
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be a significant issue and an important aspect of NYSE and NASD
regulation. In that regard, the NYSE has developed a competence in
examining and assuring the financial viability of its large member
firms that would not easily be duplicated by a single SRO, located in
Washington, D.C., and indirectly run by the SEC. Moreover, now
that securities firms, banks and insurance companies can operate in a
single holding company, the Federal Reserve Board, as an umbrella
regulator, will be weighing in heavily on securities industry capital
adequacy questions.' When the NYSE or NASDAQ go public, it is
likely that clearing member firms will be large stockholders. This will
give them an incentive to maintain high standards of financial and
operational capabilities for member firms. The changing nature of
ownership may create some new conflicts of interest, but others will
be resolved because market makers and floor members will have a
diminished role in exchange governance. This is also true for
demutualized commodities exchanges. The creation of a single SRO
would not solve conflicts among members regarding appropriate
capital adequacy rules.
What could call into question continued capital adequacy
regulation is the changing structure of financial services regulation.
Functional regulation is now the prevailing mode of developing and
enforcing capital adequacy regulations. Although the SEC adopts net
capital rules for securities firms, it relies upon the NYSE and NASD
to conduct broker-dealer examinations and enforce capital
requirements. But the emergence of huge financial conglomerates
may raise questions as to the effectiveness and adequacy of this
scheme. Financial holding companies need to manage complicated
risk on a global basis. Whether the wide array of financial regulators
for these holding companies will be able to cooperatively develop
new standards for measuring risks on a global basis and then garner
the talent to examine firms and enforce financial regulations is an
open question.
The incentive of the NYSE and Nasdaq to police their markets
for manipulation, and their effectiveness in doing so, would probably
be greater following a public offering than it is today. There should
be fewer conflicts of interest in policing the markets if ownership of
these SROs is spread beyond those concerned with making markets.
Since Nasdaq is a dealer market and the NYSE is a specialist system,
the creation of a single SRO to oversee these two markets is unlikely
to create any economies of scale and could well be counterproductive.
Even if the SEC succeeds in mandating or fostering the creation of
308. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley, Financial Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-
102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
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new mechanisms for linking exchange and OTC markets," it is
unlikely that these markets will lose their particular characteristics.
The changing structure of the securities trading markets have
raised a host of issues detailed in Parts II-IV of this article that
competing SROs will be unable to solve. Although a single SRO
might be better able to develop inter-market solutions to problems
that cut across markets, joint SRO plans, like the CTA, are now
unraveling. The real issue is whether regulatory solutions to these
issues are needed or their resolution should be left to the market.
This depends, in part, on whether the price discovery mechanism for
equities is a natural monopoly in the sense that however many orders
and intermediaries are formed into pools of liquidity, there is a public
interest need to consolidate orders in a transparent system.
Alternatively, can the trading markets be fragmented and still
function in a fair and efficient manner?
Self-regulation of the broker-customer relationship is another
issue. Although just and equitable principles of trade have long been
a basis for SRO policing of sales practices, many SRO enforcement
actions are based on securities fraud under the federal securities laws.
Further, aggressive SEC oversight and the threat of civil liability in
actions by customers are necessary prods to SRO effectiveness. It is
unclear how consolidation of self-regulation would improve
enforcement of high standards of broker-dealer customer practices.
On the other hand, a for-profit marketplace might not be interested
in devoting its resources to funding a rigorous enforcement program
in this area, or it might decide to make enforcement penalties a
source of its funding.
(2) Competing Models
The Securities Industry Association's (SIA) Ad Hoc Committee
on the Regulatory Implications of De-Mutualization has determined
guiding principles for analyzing an appropriate SRO structure and
has suggested six different models for future regulation of the
securities industry. 10 The SIA's Ad Hoc Committee's guidelines for
evaluating regulatory options state that any regulatory structure
should foster investor protection; preserve fair competition; eliminate
inefficiencies; encourage expert regulation; promote reasonable and
fair regulatory costs; foster due process; and encourage industry
participation and self-regulation.31' The five models the Committee
309. See Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC, Dynamic Markets, Timeless Principles,
Address at Columbia Law School (Sept. 23, 1999), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speeche/speecharchive/1999/spch295.htm.
310. SIA WHITE PAPER, supra note 162.
311. See id. at 1.
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put forward are, in addition to status quo, (1) Multiple Exchanges
with Separate Boards and Information Barriers for Their Regulatory
Arms (NASDR Model); (2) Multiple SROs with Firms Designated to
a Single SRO for Examination Purposes (DEA Model); (3) One SRO
for Member Firms; Markets Regulate Their Own Trading (Hybrid
Model); (4) All Purpose Single SRO (Single SRO Model); and (5)
Single Regulatory Organization (SEC-Only Model).1 2
The SIA's Ad Hoc Committee endorsed the Hybrid Model in
which there would be a central SRO responsible for firm oversight
and cross market issues, including rules generally applicable to all
markets.313 Individual market SROs would then be responsible for
market-specific rules, including rules regarding trading and listing.314
Cross-market rules would include front running, manipulation, free-
riding and withholding rules, sales practice regulation, industry
admission standards, financial responsibility requirements, training
and supervision and recordkeeping.3 s Arguments in favor of the
Hybrid Model are that this model would improve regulation, decrease
regulatory costs, preserve the synergy between markets and market-
specific oversight, foster competition and continue self-regulation.3 6
On March 22, 2000 the SIA board of directors endorsed the Hybrid
Model.3 7  One reason for this endorsement is that the securities
industry would like to avoid duplication of examinations and
inconsistent regulation. In that connection, the White Paper
advocates a single, independent arbitration forum.
The NASD has been pushing for a Single SRO model and the
Chairman of the SEC briefly embraced this model.31S One of the
problems With this model is that the NYSE opposes it.319 Another
problem is that the SEC does not have the statutory authority to
impose corporate governance requirements on listed companies and
312. See id. at 5.
313. SIA, REINVENTING SELF-REGULATION-RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING
SELF-REGULATORY STRUCTURE (last modified Mar. 8, 2000), available at
http://www.sia.com.
314. See id. at 2.
315. See id. at 3.
316. See id. at 5.
317. See Press Release, SIA, Securities Industry Board Endorses "Hybrid" Model to
Enhance Benefits of Self-Regulation for Investors (last modified Mar. 22, 2000), available
at http://www.sia.com/html/pr993.html.
318. See Jeffrey E. Garten, Manager's Journal: How to Keep NYSE's Stock High,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 1999, at A44; Michael Schroeder, Levitt Studies Plan for Single
Market Regulator, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 1999, at C1. See also Press Release, NASD,
NASD's Frank Zarb Asks Securities Industry to Embrace Change (last modified June 23,
1999), available at http://www.nasd.com.
319. See Lisa L. Fried, Plans Debated for Stock Markets' For-Profit Conversion,
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 30, 1999, at 5; Richard A. Grasso, Testimony before the Sen. Banking
Comm. (Sept. 28, 1999), available at http://www.nyse.com/speech/NT000245.html.
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neither would a free standing Single SRO.32 Further, although the
SEC might find it convenient to oversee a sole self-regulator, the SEC
might be tempted to make it an arm of the government, rather than a
true self regulator. Yet, SROs do not afford those they discipline the
protections of persons who are investigated or prosecuted by
government officials. 2'
One of the goals of the Exchange Act is "fair competition among
brokers and dealers, among exchange markets, and between
exchange markets and markets other than exchange markets."'  For
the SEC to suppress or eliminate competition among SROs could be
contrary to thisgoal because an important function of an exchange is
self-regulation. On the other hand, an ATS regulated as a member
of an exchange could complain of unfair competition, and yet find it
uneconomical to become a full service SRO. Further, although the
benefits of regulatory competition are often touted, regulatory
competition can be unseemly and destructive of public confidence in
the regulators. Given the serious fissures within the securities
industry at the present time, the Hybrid Model seems the most likely
solution to self-regulation after demutualization if the NYSE can be
persuaded to endorse some version of this model.
One of the many difficulties with any new SRO structure is
adequate funding. Currently, SROs rely on four primary sources for
their funding: (1) Regulatory fees and assessments paid by SRO
members; (2) transaction services fees; (3) listing fees; and (4) market
information fees. 4 The continued viability of all of these fees in
rapidly changing market conditions is unclear. The SEC has issued a
complex and provocative release on some of these fees, and however
uncomfortable the SEC may be with establishing fees for market
users, this is an issue that will not disappear.3 Clearly, rigorous,
expert and fair regulation is not possible unless SRO regulation is
adequately funded. But after demutualization, subsidizing general
broker-dealer enforcement activities through fees other than
regulatory assessments of members may prove difficult. On the other
hand, the exchanges could try to make fines and penalties a profit
stream and this would raise a variety of new questions and problems.
This suggests that the securities industry is likely to focus on the costs
of duplicative self-regulation.
320. See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406,406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
321. See, e.g., In the matter of Stephen J. Gluckman, Exchange Act Release No. 41,628,
70 SEC DOC. 323 (July 20,1999).
322. Exchange Act § 11A(a)(1)(C)(ii), 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(C)(ii).
323. See id., § 6(b).
324. See SIA WHITE PAPER, supra note 162, at 35.
325. See Exchange Act Release No. 42,208, 64 Fed. Reg. 70,613 (Dec. 17, 1999).
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The futures industry could perhaps move more easily to a sole
self-regulator than the securities industry because the NFA already
exists and has statutory recognition. But neither the CME or CBOT
have determined to contract out their regulatory functions. Further,
such a contracting out raises issues regarding the exchange's
continuing responsibility over its contractor and the relationship of
both entities to a government regulator.32 Demutualization of futures
exchanges and their need to face competition from electronic
exchanges has highlighted another problem - the need to level the
playing field between traditional exchanges and ATSs by decreasing
government regulation of exchanges.327 The SEC has recognized this
challenge in fashioning Regulation ATS,3 but it has not dealt with
the need to significantly change its regulation of traditional
exchanges. Yet, if exchanges no longer enjoy a monopoly (or near
monopoly) of trading the stocks of their listed issuers, or trading
other financial products, much less government regulation is needed
because competition can substitute for government regulation. The
CFTC has been pushed in the direction of turning more front line
regulation over to exchanges, but the SEC has been engaged in more
intrusive market regulation. One possible regulatory model that
could result from the demutualization of exchanges is the transfer of
regulation from SROs to the SEC. But self-regulation is so enshrined
in U.S. securities regulation it is unlikely and probably not in the
public interest for it to be supplanted by government regulation.
Indeed, greater devolution of regulatory responsibilities from the
SEC to exchanges, as is happening in commodities regulation, could
be more in tune with political realities in a global capital market.
Condusion
Today's markets are changing so rapidly that it is impossible to
predict tomorrow's market structure or its regulation. New exchange
governance and regulatory structures generally have been
precipitated by scandals or a financial crisis, so reform of existing
exchange models is likely to be shaped by political and economic
problems as much as by strategic business planning. Although the
diversification of exchange boards has strengthened them, those who
make markets still have the greatest interest in maintaining efficient,
fair and liquid pricing mechanisms. Much of the competition to the
NYSE and Nasdaq in recent years has come from new electronic
marketplaces that have taken advantage of uneconomical spreads by
326. See IOSCO DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 297, at 8.
327. See Oversight Function for CFTC Emerging as Congress Seeks to Renew Mandate,
32 See. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), at 92 (Jan. 24,2000).
328. See Adopting ATS Release, supra note 7, at 70,846.
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the primary markets. Now that trading costs have declined due to
decimalization, some of these competitors will not survive. A similar
dynamic is at play concerning the trading of financial futures. In time
it is likely that the NYSE and CBOT will move to electronic trading
systems and their floors will disappear. But this is not a decision that
should be made or forced by government regulators. Further, it does
not follow that the NYSE and CBOT will cease to be primary
markets.
There seems to be a general assumption that the market
structure changes rocking the security industry are harbingers of an
inevitable cataclysm that will swallow up the NYSE floor-based
specialist system and the NASD market maker system. Further,
demutualization seems to be, at least in part, a cover for shifting the
power structure of the NYSE and Nasdaq further away from the
specialists and market makers to the large securities firms. This does
not mean that the markets of the future will be a "black box" that
does not require dealer intervention or that demutualization will
solve the economic and power struggles taking place in the financial
services industry.
The ATS electronic systems have not yet become primary
markets and therefore their successful operation as price setting
mechanisms is uncertain. In that connection, the SEC is unlikely to
allow the market for U.S. equities to seriously fragment to the
detriment of retail investors.329 Also, the success of ATSs in the OTC
market is due in part to a shift in the ratio of dealer to agency
transactions, and this shift may not be necessary to achieve optimal
efficiency in the NYSE market.33 In addition, the viability of ATS
electronic markets have not yet been tested by a violent market break
or a serious and prolonged bear market. In volatile markets, the need
for the negative and affirmative obligations imposed upon specialists
is significant, and it is unclear how markets will be held to a fair and
orderly standard in the absence of such dealer intervention. If traders
can no longer make money on spreads they will make money by
exploiting time and place advantages, and such unfair and inevuitable
conduct will sooner or later attract the attention of regulators.
For all of these reasons it is hard to predict the future structure
of the securities markets and the future governance and regulation of
329. See NYSE Rulemaking: Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change By the New
York Stock Exchange, Inc To Rescind Exchange Rule 390, Exchange Act Release No.
42,450 (Feb. 23, 2000) available at 2000 WL 202094.
330. See Guy MOSZKOWSKI ET AL., SOLOMON SMITH BARNEY EQUITY RESEARCH:
UNITED STATES, TRADING UP-THE EQuITY MARKETS AND THE NEW WORLD OF
ELECTRONIC TRADING 20-21 (Oct. 5, 1999).
331. See Greg Ip, Catbird Seat: Nasdaq Market Maker, Seeing All the Orders, Becomes
Canny Trader, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3,2000, at Al.
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stock exchanges. While writing this article, the author has been
challenged to set forth a vision of the future structure of the trading
markets and appropriate new SRO models. But at this time, when
markets, financial intermediaries and regulators are all being buffeted
by vigorous economic and political forces of change, it is difficult
enough to formulate regulatory issues and impossible for any one
person to have the answers to the questions being raised.
Issues about exchange governance probably do not have to be
fully resolved prior to demutualization because one of the objectives
of demutualization is to streamline governance and base it upon stock
ownership rather than constituency representation of member firms.
A period of trial and error can be expected and should be welcomed.
Issues concerning the balance between government regulation and
self-regulation and the regulatory implications of demutualization
may be more urgent because the SEC may not allow the exchanges to
demutualize unless it is satisfied with the securities industry's new
self-regulatory structure.32 It would be a mistake, however, for the
SEC or CFTC to force a new system of self-regulation on evolving
exchange markets. If a demutualized NASD operates by separating
its SRO and market functions and other exchanges do not, time will
judge which system produces better markets and better regulations.
The form of tomorrow's trading markets should be permitted to
evolve before the existing SRO structure is endorsed, dismantled or
otherwise adjusted to compliment a new market structure.
Demutualization of exchanges will shift the power structures
within exchanges, but public offerings of exchanges will change them
much more. By raising new capital, exchanges will be able to
implement new business strategies. But the freedom of public
ownership will add burdens to exchange operations. New disclosure
and reporting duties will affect cultures of confidentiality and even
(from the public's viewpoint) mystery. To the extent that broker-
dealer regulation is subsidized by listed companies, and this is
disclosed in detailed public documents, these issuers may object to
this use of listing fees. The disclosure of other income streams could
cause similar problems. Exchange executives will have to learn to
deal with security analysts and plaintiff securities lawyers. Stock
market corrections may adversely affect the stock of exchanges
disproportionately to general indices. Issues will be raised concerning
the permissible ownership of exchanges, whether they can become
332. The SEC's plenary power over exchanges may not be fully appreciated. Even
before the 1975 Act, the SEC believed it had the power to prevent the NYSE from
incorporating. See SEC Comments on NYSE Incorporation, Exchange Act Release No.
9112 (Mar. 17, 1971), 1997 WL 17117.
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takeover targets, and what lines of business they should be allowed to
enter.
During the 1990s, for political and economic reasons, business
enjoyed the public's respect and entrepreneurship was fashionable. If
there is a prolonged stock market decline and an economic recession,
public perceptions might shift. A nonprofit organization enjoys a
greater aura of acting in the public interest than does a for-profit
corporation.
There is a risk that turning exchanges into ordinary public
companies will undermine public confidence in these symbols of
capitalism. Yet, this is the price exchanges may have to pay to assure
their future survival.
